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Summary of Thesis
This thesis’s aim was to examine the effect of vocal intonation on mental state 
understanding. This thesis has found that vocal intonation provides important cues 
for communicating the intentions of others’ to infants. The results indicate that 
infants rely on intonation when making attributions about other people’s goal-directed 
behaviour. These results were first found using an imitation paradigm and extended 
and confirmed with a looking time paradigm. The first two experimental chapters of 
this thesis have shown that the tone of voice is a salient cue to mental states. Infants 
did not only distinguish between intentional and accidental words such as “Whoops” 
and “There” but they also made the distinction between intentional and accidental 
mental states from the intonation alone. A looking time measure has also shown 
promising results for the same distinction between intentional and accidental mental 
states. The looking time study has confirmed and extended the findings that we saw 
through imitation. Infants seemed able to distinguish between an intentional and an 
accidental intonation and looked longer during scenes where the accidental intonation 
was paired with the end-result. These findings are the first to report results on the 
intonation of accidental and intentional mental states. The results of this thesis 
contribute to the literature concerning intention understanding and they extend our 
knowledge about intonation and the significant role it plays in infancy.
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This introduction aims to familiarise the reader with some of the concepts that 
are central to this thesis, such as intonation and intention. The first part of the 
introduction will look at intonation and its importance in the lives of babies and 
infants. I will review how intonation affects behaviour in infants and talk about the 
acoustical cues that influence this reliance on different kinds of intonation. In this 
second part of the introduction I will also introduce the concept of intention which 
plays an important role in organising behaviour and which allows us to interpret 
behaviour as a result of understanding intentions. I will consider in detail studies that 
have examined intention understanding and will finally talk about the aim of this 
thesis which is to address intention understanding through intonation in toddlers.
Intonation
1.1 Definition of Intonation
Intonation is an important aspect of communication. The tone of voice is used 
to express emotion and is particularly useful in conveying meaning. Intonation is 
often referred to as prosody and paralanguage. The tone of voice in an utterance 
carries the extralexical meaning, which is the meaning that we would not necessarily 
get from the lexical aspects of the utterance, such as the words. An example of this is 
in utterances that are meant to convey sarcasm or irony. Often in those situations, the 
person is trying to convey the contrast in their message with a sarcastic or an ironic 
tone of voice (Capelli, Nakagawa & Madden, 1990). In addition, intonation conveys 
meaning about discourse, for example, inviting the listener to make a contribution to 
the conversation, and about attitudes such as being condescending (Cruttenden, 1997). 
Intonation includes pitch (fundamental frequency), duration, and loudness (intensity).
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According to Gussenhoven (2004), pitch is the “auditory sensation of tonal height” 
(p.l). Pitch results from the vibration of the vocal cords within the larynx, and is 
often used interchangeably with fundamental frequency. However, fundamental 
frequency (Fo) refers to the number of repetitions of the regular waveform within one 
second (Cruttenden, 1997), whereas pitch is what we can hear and which allows us to 
make distinctions between tones that have high and low pitch (Cruttenden, 1997). 
Duration refers to the length of a vowel or word or sentence both in terms of its 
production and in terms of the length that it is perceived to have when it is heard. 
Finally, intensity is concerned with the “breath force” which is used by the speaker 
(Cruttenden, 1997, p.2). Other definitions of intonation include the description of 
“the musical part of speech” (Balog & Snow, 2007 p. 118).
1.2 Intonation contours as signals for infants
Femald (1992) reported that the intonation contours of maternal speech 
change according to the message the parent is trying to convey to the infant.
Femald’s research revealed that these contours and the messages they convey are 
similar in different cultures. For example when communicating approval, mothers 
whose language was English, German, French or Italian tended to have high mean 
pitch, wider pitch range and the intonation contour in these utterances tended to be 
rise-fall (bell-shaped). On the contrary, prohibitions were characterised as having 
lower mean pitch and a narrow pitch range. Vocalisations that conveyed comfort on 
the other hand had a more smooth and legato quality. In addition to these qualities, 
when trying to engage attention from an infant, mothers used rising pitch contours 
(Femald, 1992). Furthermore, more recent research appears to support that it is 
through associations between affective contexts and prosodic contours that infants
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come to make sense of sound-meaning correspondences that lead to the 
communication of intention and emotion (Snow & Balog, 2002). Gradually, towards 
the end of the first year, the tone of voice serves as a marker of words as it highlights 
and helps the infant identify linguistic units in the speech stream (Femald, 1992).
Stem, Spieker and MacKain (1982) considered intonation contours as 
meaningful units of information for 6 month old infants. In their study they looked at 
different intonation contours to examine the possibility of them acting as signals that 
communicated maternal intentions, motives, states and feelings. This study is 
particularly interesting because the researchers were interested in the communicative 
function of these contours and thus they looked at the interrelationship between pitch 
contour, sentence type and the context in which these utterances from mother to child 
were uttered in. Five contour patterns were identified such as sinusoidal, bell, bell 
right, rise and fall, however, the two that were more consistently seen in the six 
mothers were the rising and the sinusoidal. The rising contour was uttered in 
situations where the infant looked away from the mother with neutral affect, which is 
suggested to have as a goal to get the infant’s attention. The sinusoidal contour was 
expressed more in situations where the infant was smiling and looking at the mother, 
that may act to maintain the positive affect shared between mother and child.
Similarly, Sullivan and Horowitz (1983) tested the effect that intonation has 
on the attention of two month old infants. In this study they used both natural and 
computer synthesised intonations that had a rising or falling contour. By using an 
infant controlled preferential listening paradigm they found that infants attended more 
to intonation expressed with a rising contour than to contours with a falling contour in 
the natural stimuli. Interestingly, the opposite effect was found for the stimuli 
presented with the computer synthesised intonation. In these stimuli, infants attended
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more to the falling contour. One possible suggestion for these findings is that infants 
might not have noticed the change in contour but might have taken into account the 
voice quality of the computer synthesised speech. Although the researchers were not 
able to offer an explanation for this finding, they concluded that the naturalistic rising 
intonation contour of the female voice is effective in not only eliciting but also 
maintaining the attention of infants.
1.3 Intonation production in infants and young children
The results of research on intonation expression in adults seem to be consistent 
through studies. However, when it comes to intonation production in infants, the 
results are not so harmonious. Balog and Snow (2007) review literature on the 
development of intonation in infancy and early childhood and they point out the 
different and often contrasting nature of the results of these studies. For example, 
they report that some studies have found that intonation is developed by the time 
infants have produced their first words whereas other studies show that intonation 
develops in a more unstable fashion. Snow and Balog (2002) suggest that infants 
produce some core features of intonation before they produce two word utterances but 
not before they produce their first words. Although detection and understanding 
studies demonstrate that infants are more attentive to rising contours, when it comes 
to production, the pattern is different as infants tend to be able to produce the falling 
intonation contour earlier that the rising intonation contour. This might not be so 
surprising, as studies with young children have shown that even 4-year-olds have 
difficulty producing rising contours. A study by Patel and Grigos (2006) has found 
that 4-year-olds tend to elongate the final syllable of sentences when they are trying to 
produce questions (rising contours), rather than using higher pitch and intensity as 7-
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and 11-year-olds did in this study. These researchers concluded that even at age 7 
children are still developing their mastery of intensity in producing rising intonations 
but by 11 years, children are using mainly changes in pitch to indicate this type of 
contour and not so much changes in intensity and duration, which is more inline with 
the acoustic cues used by adults.
Similar findings about the production of rising intonation by 5-year-olds have 
been shown by Wells, Peppe and Goulandris (2004). However, in their study they 
propose that when it comes to communicative intent in speech, even 5-year-olds are 
able to phrase a sentence in a way that it conveys information about their intended 
meaning. However, this study has found that infants are still immature in their 
intonation production abilities in producing such meaning with intonational emphasis 
to aspects of sentences that give out the intended meaning (Wells et al, 2004). This 
study also makes an emphasis on individual difference in intonation production as 
they propose that even at ten years when children are reaching adult levels of prosodic 
development, there is still variability within the 10-year-olds development.
These findings show that intonation is a difficult part of speech to master 
vocally. Although production of intonation seems a complex task for young infants 
and childreii, it is on the contrary a lot easier for them to process and attribute 
meaning to intonation even in infancy. In the next section I will review some of the 
findings that show that infants can differentiate through vocal intonation.
1.4 Intonation in infant-directed speech
1.4.1 Studies on young infants ’ sensitivity to infant-directed speech
Infants are sensitive to vocal characteristics from the womb. Even before birth 
infants are able to perceive the tone of voice in human speech and shortly after birth
5
they are capable of discriminating between their mother’s voice and a stranger’s voice 
(Hepper, Scott, & Shahidullah, 1993). Well documented research finds that infants 
are not just interested in any kind of voice, in particular they prefer the high pitched 
infant-directed speech, in contrast to adult-directed speech (Femald, 1985,1991; 
Hepper et al, 1993). In particular studies have found that the difference between 
infant-directed and adult-directed speech lays in the variation in pitch rather than 
other aspects of intonation such as duration and amplitude (Femald & Kuhl, 1987). 
Recent research has also suggested that what infants find more attractive in infant- 
directed speech is the expression of emotion which is more exaggerated in infant 
directed speech as compared to typical adult-directed speech (Trainor, Austin & 
Desjardins, 2000). Trainor et al. (2000) have suggested that the emotion in infant 
directed speech might be vital for communication.
Femald and Simon (1984) have suggested four hypotheses concerning how 
infant-directed speech influences communication in infancy. The first hypothesis 
relates to why infants have a preference for infant-directed speech. They suggest that 
it may be as a result of the intonation patterns being perceptually more salient and 
therefore more interesting as auditory stimuli. A second hypothesis refers to the 
communication of maternal affect to infants. Infant-directed speech is expressed with 
high pitch and expanded pitch range, two acoustic characteristics that are associated 
with positive affect and happiness, therefore infant-directed speech could be 
communicating affective cues to infants. Thirdly, Femald and Simon suggest that 
infant-directed speech might function as a way for infants to identify their mother. In 
support of this hypothesis, Mehler, Bertoncini, Barriere and Jassik-Gerschenfeld 
(1978) found that infants in their first month recognised their mother when she spoke 
with exaggerated intonation but did not recognise her when she spoke in a monotone
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way. The fourth hypothesis relates to the effect of intonation on the speech 
perception skills of infants, and I will explore this further in the section below.
1.4.2 Intonation in linguistic development
As we have seen above, the tone of voice and in particular infant-directed 
speech is influential not only for being an attractive stimulus that infants like to listen 
to, but as we will see below, it also functions in helping infants attain the perceptual 
basis of the language they will later learn to speak. The tone of voice plays an 
important role in the perceptual and parsing abilities of young infants as it aids in their 
attempts to parse spoken language, an important first step on the path to making sense 
of spoken language. This is supported by recent research which shows that infant- 
directed speech facilitates word segmentation skills (Thiessen, Hill & Saffran, 2005). 
These researchers point out that although infants are able to segment adult-directed 
speech, they are better in segmentation with infant-directed speech which suggests 
that this type of speech might provide faster and more efficient learning for infants. A 
second interesting function of infant-directed speech which could facilitate aspects of 
speech is the capacity of infant-directed speech to maintain infant attention.
Attention plays an integral part in learning because it provides infants with the 
necessary concentration for them to perceive and process information. Thirdly, 
infants’ word recognition abilities appear to be related to the emotion contained in 
speech (Singh, Morgan & White, 2004). It has been found that positive affect, as 
expressed in the voice, has a greater impact on the recognition abilities of infants at 
around 7.5 months than neutral affect. Infants in this study were habituated to words 
expressed in happy or neutral affect. These words were later presented in passages 
that were spoken in neutral or happy affect. Young infants of 7.5 months were able to
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recognise the words they had been familiarised with when these words were presented 
in passages expressed with the same affect as the familiar word. Slightly older 
infants, 10.5-month-olds were even better at recognising both happy and neutral 
words when these were presented in a neutral passage and happy and neutral words 
when these were presented in a happy passage. Together these results demonstrate 
that intonation serves a central function to the linguistic abilities of young infants.
1.4.3 Effects o f intonation on infant behaviour -  social referencing studies
In addition to being a signal for aspects of language, intonation also plays a 
role in regulating infant behaviour. One of the paradigms used to study this 
regulating effect is the social referencing paradigm. In social referencing situations, 
studies are formulated in a way in which infants have to seek out signals from others 
on how to proceed in a strange situation. This procedure has been utilised to examine 
how infants use emotional cues, especially from their caregivers in order to regulate 
and guide their own behaviour. In these studies infants are presented with strange 
toys and they are given either facial, vocal, or bimodal cues from their parents that 
either encourage or discourage toy exploration. Researchers then look at the amount 
of toy exploration infants choose to carry out with each cue (Homik, Risenhoover & 
Gunnar, 1987; Mumme et al., 1996). For example, Moses, Baldwin, Rosicky & 
Tidball (2001), examined the behaviour of 12- and 18-month-olds in a novel toy 
situation with the positive emotion of excitement and the negative emotion of disgust. 
Infants in this study engaged more with the toy if the experimenter regarded it with 
positive intonation than when she referred to it with a negative tone of voice. In 
addition, they found that infants looked longer at the face in the disgust expression 
and they propose that it might be the result of the children taking longer to assess
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whether something that was there in front of them was also something that they 
should not make contact with (Moses et al., 2001).
Similar studies using nonverbal cues have been conducted using the visual 
cliff method. In the visual cliff paradigm, infants receive cues that encourage them to 
cross or not cross what appears to be a drop or a cliff (Sorce, Emde, Campos, 
Klinnert, 1985; Vaish & Striano, 2004). While most studies that have used the social 
referencing paradigm had focused on facial cues, three studies, two using the “strange 
toy” paradigm (Moses et al. 2001; Mumme et al., 1996) and one using the “visual 
cliff’ paradigm (Vaish & Striano, 2004) have been able to exploit the contribution of 
visual and vocal cues on regulating the behaviour of 12- and 18-month-olds. There is 
evidence that suggests that during the first year of life infants are more responsive to 
the tone of voice than facial expressions, as the mother’s voice in social referencing 
situations is more effective at controlling infant behaviour than her face (Mumme, 
Femald & Herrera, 1996; Vaish & Striano, 2004). One reason for this greater 
sensitivity to the voice might be attributable to infants’ inability to understand words. 
Consequently the tone of voice which is a dynamic stimulus may become their 
primary channel for communication. These studies have found that voice cues on 
their own generated less “strange toy” exploration and more crossing over the cliff, 
unlike the facial cues which were not as effective in regulating infant behaviour.
1.5 Developmental changes
1.5.1 Developmental changes o f reliance on intonation in infants and young 
children.
This section focuses on some studies that have shown developmental changes 
in the reliance on intonation. It has been argued that intonation has a U-shaped
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function in infancy and that reliance on intonation changes in relation to language 
acquisition (Friend, 2001). It is therefore important to review these findings because 
the age range of the participating infants in this thesis incorporates the stage at which 
infants are acquiring their first words.
One study that has examined the relation of intonation with word learning was 
conducted by Margaret Friend (2001). This study examined the significance of 
affective messages on the regulation of behaviour in infants. This study’s design 
utilised both congruent (facial and vocal paralanguage was consistent with the lexical 
content) and incongruent (facial and vocal paralanguage was inconsistent with the 
lexical content) messages for prohibiting and encouraging 15-month-old infants to 
play with four novel toys. The study found that on the average, infant behaviour was 
regulated by facial and vocal paralanguage, as infants approached and played longer 
with the toys when the paralanguage was approving than when it was disapproving. 
However, comparisons between language level (as measured on the vocabulary 
inventory CDI) and reliance on lexical or paralinguistic cues revealed that behaviour 
was better regulated by the lexical cues for infants who had a higher receptive 
vocabulary and comprehended more stimulus words. This result is consistent with 
preliminary support by Lawrence and Femald (1993; as cited in Friend, 2001) who 
studied behaviour regulation in 9- to 18-month-olds. They found that the behaviour 
of 9-month-olds was better regulated by the paralinguistic cues than by the lexical 
cues, whereas the behaviour of the 18-month-olds was regulated by the lexical content 
of the stimuli.
Across the span of childhood, similar changes in reliance have been observed. 
Two studies that examined changes in dependence on intonation and lexical cues were 
performed with children between 4 and 10 years (Friend, 2000; Friend & Bryant,
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2000) and adults (Morton & Trehub, 2001). The paradigm used in these studies 
presents participants with conflicting lexical utterances such as “I got an ice cream for 
being good” being expressed in a negative tone of voice. These studies found that 4- 
year-olds relied on the lexical cues when making judgements on how the speaker was 
feeling whereas 10-year-olds and adults based their judgements of how the speaker 
was feeling from the tone of voice. These researchers concluded that young children 
have an understanding of the role of vocal emotion in communication because when 
they were presented without the lexical cues (e.g., low-pass filtered speech or foreign 
language) even the 4-year-olds were able to offer correct answers as to what the 
intonation expressed. The difficulty tends to be in the conflicting cues, something that 
suggests that young children might have a bias or selective attention towards lexical 
cues, or an inflexibility which does not allow them to take both lexical and intonation 
cues into account when making judgements about people’s emotions (Friend, 2000; 
Morton & Trehub, 2001).
One other conclusion from these studies is that children might have not 
acquired knowledge about the importance of coordination of intonation and lexical 
cues in communicating information about the underlying meaning such as for ironic 
and sarcastic messages (Friend & Bryant, 2000; Pexman, Glenwright, Hala, Kowbel 
& Jungen, 2006). Another possibility is that children might have difficulty integrating 
the vocal and the verbal information, and therefore, they find it hard to judge the 
emotion in the intonation when the emotion in the verbal content is conflicting. 
Although one would expect a linear progression in children’s focus from one cue to 
another over developmental time, this does not seem to be the case. Instead, the 
development of the focus on intonation and lexical content seems to be characterised 
by a U-shaped function. Friend’s (2000; 2001) studies show clearly that infants begin
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to pay attention to the tone of voice during their first year and then in the second year 
they tend to focus their attention to words, while later at 10 years, they again seem to 
focus more on the intonation than on the conflicting message of the lexical content. 
According to Friend (2004) in the first year, attending to nonverbal cues allows 
infants to form the basis for communication. Later in their second year their attention 
shifts to language which is a more mature function and which demands more from the 
infants in order to be acquired. In addition, later on at age 10 we can see a shift again 
towards intonation which could suggest that as children have acquired language they 
might shift again to more subtle aspects of communication such as those conveyed 
through the tone of voice.
1.6 Intonation and mental states
1.6.1 Intonation expresses emotions; does it also express mental states?
As we have seen in the previous sections, intonation is often linked with the 
expression of emotions and moods. However, intonation can go beyond just 
indicating the emotions of other people. It can also be used in the expression of 
attitudes and mental states. For example, Cruttenden (1997) argued that intonation 
can be used to show attitudes and often linguistic features of speech such as 
indications of when it is another person’s turn to talk. These ways in which people 
manipulate their intonation can give us vital indications about their intentions, desires 
and beliefs. Intentions, desires and beliefs are often described as mental states. They 
are called mental states because they refer to internal states of one’s mind, often 
thought as unobservable which can be inferred or deduced through actions and 
behavioural indicators. We propose that the tone of voice can be one behavioural
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indicator of these mental states, as it can be a channel for making these mental states 
into observable entities.
Research with adult participants has been carried out on their ability to 
recognise emotions and mental states from the tone of voice. According to Scherer 
(2001), for a concept to be identified as emotion, it needs to fit all five of the 
following categories. First, there needs to be a subjective feeling, second, there has to 
be an expression of that emotion, third, there should be a cognitive appraisal and 
evaluation of that emotion, forth, there should be physiology associated with the 
emotion and fifth, there should be an action tendency. Although I would agree with 
Scherer on the first 4 points, I disagree on the last point as sometimes we might feel 
an emotion but we might not be able or not willing to act on it. Some concepts such 
as happiness and sadness which belong to the basic emotions category can be more 
automatic and recognised without a lot of conscious input. However concepts such as 
the mental states of intentions, desires and beliefs might be more difficult to identify. 
This might be because mental states are more cognitive in nature and might involve 
more conscious input from the receiver in order to infer a mental state than a basic 
emotion. In addition, mental states might also be more difficult to identify if the 
context is not available to the individual. Mental states on one hand might be related 
to the family of emotions but they might need more cognitive processing because they 
are more difficult to discern. However some of the more complex emotions, such as 
frustration might be more difficult to understand and identify because they might 
require more cognitive processing such as appraisal of the mental states of the person 
experiencing that emotion. For example when one is trying to understand why he or 
she is feeling frustrated they might try to appraise their situation in terms of whether 
something that they wanted or intended was met or not. Therefore, this supports that
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mental states might require more processing than emotions. Golan, Baron-Cohen, and 
Hill (2006) looked at the identification abilities of a control group of typical adults 
and a group of adults with high functioning Aspergers syndrome. This study showed 
these participants both facial expressions and vocal utterances of different emotions 
(such as ‘afraid*, ‘angry’, ‘sad’ and ‘happy’) and different mental states (such as 
‘unsure’, ‘touched’ and ‘kind’) and gave participants multiple choices for the 
identification of these emotions and mental states in the two perceptual modalities. 
The results revealed that the control adults did not have difficulty recognising these 
emotions and mental states both in the face and the voice. The participants with 
Aspergers syndrome however experienced difficulties with more complex emotions 
and more complex mental states compared with more simple emotions and mental 
states. It is also important to note that these participants were matched for mental age 
and IQ.
Intonation has also been used to examine mental states in sarcasm and irony. 
Sarcasm and irony refer to situations where what is said is in contrast to what is being 
meant. These studies suggest that children and adults may be using the tone of voice 
as a tool to aid them to understand the intentions of others when they are making 
sarcastic and ironic remarks (Capelli, Nakagawa & Madden, 1990; Happe, 1995; 
Bryant & Fox Tree, 2002). In one such study, Capelli et al. (1990) found that 
sarcastic intonation cues facilitated children’s recognition of sarcasm whereas 
contextual cues had less of an effect. However, other studies have revealed the 
opposite results (Winner, Windmeuller, Rosenblatt, Bosco, Best & Gardner, 1987).
1.6.2 Infant discrimination and recognition o f emotions and simple mental states
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The ability to discriminate between emotions is one that arises early in 
infancy. Walker-Andrews defines discrimination as “the ability to tell the difference 
between two or more objects and events” (1997, p. 437). Infants as young as five 
months have been found to discriminate between a sad and happy vocal expression as 
tested in a habituation paradigm (Walker-Andrews & Grolnick, 1983). Another study 
that has shown that infants are potentially sensitive to the tone of voice as they 
recognise it to be a human trait was conducted by Walker-Andrew and Lennon
(1991). In this study 5 month olds were habituated to the vocal emotions of sadness, 
anger and happiness and they were also presented with a facial expression that 
matched the emotion or a facial expression that did not match the emotion or to a 
checkerboard. The infants in this study discriminated between the emotions when 
these were matched with a facial expression but not when these emotions were 
presented with a checkerboard. This is an interesting study which brought the 
researchers to the conclusion that the presence of a face directs infants’ attention to 
the affective quality of the face and that in previous studies that used checkerboards 
the infants could had been discriminating just on the basis of acoustic differences in 
the stimuli but not on the basis of affective meaning. However, if infants in this study 
were recognising the affective meaning of the vocal stimuli, it potentially suggests 
that infants were doing something more than just discriminating between the stimuli. 
It suggests that infants were recognising something about the meaning behind a happy 
sounding stimulus. Walker-Andrews (1997) defines recognition as “more than 
detection and discrimination; it involves the person interpreting how someone else 
will act based on the “expression” in one’s face, voice and gestures” (p. 437).
Other studies have tried to examine how intonation may come to describe the 
mental states and attitudes of adults to infants. In particular, Femald draws attention
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to the role prosodic patterns in maternal speech come to play in communicating 
maternal intentions. These communicative intentions from mother to infant have been 
examined in studies on elicitation of attention, expressing praise and showing 
approval and prohibition to infants. According to a model proposed by Femald
(1992), in the first year of life maternal intonation in the form of infant-directed 
speech acts as an attention elicitor for infants, as it modulates arousal and affect and 
communicates emotional meaning. This infant-directed speech paired with the 
emotional features of caretaking might communicate to infants that it is advantageous 
for them to focus on infant-directed speech, and as Femald (1992) has proposed, 
infant-directed speech has the function of alerting, soothing and offering enjoyment to 
the young infant, whilst later it helps to direct attention and moderate emotion. This 
is later followed by a period in which combined with facial and vocal expressions 
grant “initial access to the feelings and intentions of others” (p. 403) (Papousek, 
Bomstein, Nuzzo, Papousek & Symmes, 1990).
1.7 Summary of Section
In this section we looked at intonation and how the acoustic characteristics in 
the voice can help to give additional meaning to what is being said. We also saw how 
important intonation can be in the first months of life, before infants acquire language. 
In these sections it was evident that intonation can influence the behaviour of infants. 
Intonation can give information about the emotions of others but in addition it can 
also be indicative of people’s mental states such as their attitudes, their desires, 
intention and beliefs. Intonation therefore plays a very important role in 
communication and in social cognition more generally.
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Intentions
1.8 Definitions
Another primary consideration of this thesis will be one specific mental state, 
that of intention. According to Malle, Moses and Baldwin (2001) intentionality is 
linked to actions in the sense that action is directed towards events, and therefore, 
intentionality allows us to detect structure in the complex world of movement around 
us. This then allows us to organise social interactions because it helps us explain the 
behaviour of other people in terms of its underlying mental causes (Malle et al.,
2001). Malle et al, (2001) also make an important distinction between intentions and 
intentionality. They proposed that, intentionality is a quality of actions that are 
purposeful, whereas intention is an agent’s mental state that represents such actions. 
People’s mental states can sometimes arise before the execution of the action and 
sometimes they take place without the presence of any action. They therefore posit 
that for this reasons we can sometimes ascribe intentions to other people without 
having to also make judgements as to their intentionality.
1.9 Routes to Intention Understanding
The age at which infants come to understand and infer mental states such as 
intentions is often, as some continuous theorists claim, early in development, and is an 
ability that allows infants to perceive other people as intentional beings, even from the 
first months after birth (Legerstee, 2005). In contrast, discontinuous theorists believe 
that the ability to infer intentions arises in the end of the first year when they begin to 
attribute actions to the achievement of goals. Discontinuous theorists are often 
criticised that they do not provide the origins and the mechanism by which this 
intention understanding comes about, as well as the impact social interaction plays in
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infants’ ability to understand intentions. However, some other researchers provide 
some explanation on how intention understanding arises in accordance with other 
developmental abilities (Legerstee, 2005). The following sections cover some of the 
proposed routes for intention understanding. Some of the researchers propose nativist 
approaches that span from emotions and intersubjectivity to perception of actions. 
Others propose a non-nativist approach where infants gain an understanding of 
intentions through more cognitive mechanisms such as the understanding about goals 
and as a result of understanding other people’s intentions (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, 
Behne & Moll, 2005).
1.10 Perception of intersubj ectivity
The researchers who posit a continuous developmental trajectory in intention 
awareness often project an understanding of other people as intentional from an early 
age sometimes even from birth. Trevarthen (2001) for example suggests that this is 
seen when infants and their parents engage in protoconversations. Protoconversation 
refers to the phenomenon seen in the first months of an infant’s life where the parent 
and the child take turns in smiling, cooing and talking/babbling, which appears like a 
conversation between the parent and the child. Trevarthen suggests that infants are 
able to engage with others from birth because they are equipped with the ability to 
perceive emotion and engage in cooperative interactions by reading the emotions, 
motive states and movements of people, which explains infants’ ability to contribute 
and use turn taking in protoconversations (Trevarthen, 2001).
Other researchers who have proposed innate mechanisms in infancy, such as 
Maria Legerstee, suggest that infants are bom with an affect sharing device (AFS). 
This device is composed of three components which interact with one another. These
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components are the ability of infants to infer their own emotions, their ability to infer 
the emotions of other people and thirdly the ability to have a sense of emotional 
attunement. Therefore, when infants are seeing others express different emotions 
towards them they are able to reflect those emotions back through this AFS 
mechanism (Legerstee, 2005). This hypothesis is similar to that of Meltzoff and 
Moore (1977). Meltzoff and Moore (1983) have suggested that the mechanism that 
allows newborns to imitate the facial gestures of adults, such as their tongue 
protrusions and mouth openings, is facilitated by the mechanism of active intermodal 
matching. This mechanism allows infants to perceive others’ actions (in this case 
facial movements) and via their intermodal abilities they are able to perceive those 
actions and produce them themselves. In addition, the “like me” hypothesis that was 
proposed by Meltzoff proposes that infants interpret others as intentional being 
because they see themselves as intentional beings. In a recent paper Meltzoff gives 
the example of an infant wanting to grasp something and seeing another having a 
similar desire and reaching to grasp a cup in a similar way. Therefore, for Meltzoff, 
having an innate mechanism that allows infants to interpret the actions of others in 
terms of their own experiences is what helps infants to gain an understanding of other 
people’s mental states (Meltzoff, 2007).
1.11 Perception of action
Malle, Moses and Baldwin (2001) proposed that infants might get a headstart 
in their understanding of intentions through a framework where they witness the 
intentionality of others through their actions, and specifically self-propelled motion. 
The literature on action perception proposes two broad accounts for the development 
of understanding of action. Some researchers suggest that understanding of actions
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comes early on in development from the first few months of an infant’s life. In some 
studies, researchers have shown that infants are sensitive to actions that are projected 
towards objects. For example, Woodward has shown that infants as young as 6 
months perceive human hands to be directing their action towards an object that they 
had grasped in the past and not towards a new object (Woodward, 1998). Also, 
infants attribute goal directed behaviour to grasping actions but not back of hand 
actions. In addition, Woodward and her colleagues have found that infants of 7 and 
12 months do not recognise the hand to be directed towards objects when properties 
of the hand are changed, such as wearing a glove. However, when infants were 
explicitly shown that the glove is worn by a human agent, they were able to attribute 
intentionality and goal directed behaviour to the hand action (Guajardo & Woodward, 
2004). Whereas some researchers such as Woodward support that very young infants 
are able to attribute goal directedness to human agents and familiar actions such as 
grasping, others have proposed a “wide scope” approach.
In contrast, Gergely and colleagues put forward the hypothesis that young 
infants understand actions that are unfamiliar (such as back of hand actions) because 
they are equipped with an abstract and domain specific action representation system, 
which they called the teleological stance (Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra & Biro, 1995). 
The teleological stance assumes that goal directed actions and agents are rational and 
change in accordance to the affordances in situations, as well as having change on the 
end state of the situation. The conclusion about the teleological stance was attained 
with infants between 9 and 12 months. Gergely and colleagues thus criticised the 
studies by Woodward because in those studies the attainment of the goal was not 
followed by a movement in the actual toy but instead the hand or the other unfamiliar 
grasping movements remained static on the toy and the event would end like that.
20
Therefore, according to Gergely and colleagues, there was no rationality involved in 
these events as the toy object was not moved, and thus Woodward found results for 
the human agent’s familiar actions and not the unfamiliar actions. According to 
Gergely and colleagues, if there was a rational goal attainment and change in the end 
state, the infants would have attributed goal directedness to both the familiar and 
unfamiliar actions (Kiraly, Jovanovic, Prinz, Aschersleben & Gergely, 2002). In fact 
these researchers also suggested that the reason why Woodward found the result of 
longer looking at the same toy but in the new location was because of the fact that the 
toy was in a new location and thus there was a change in the location, something that 
they had not seen during habituation.
Similarly to Gergely and colleagues, other researchers have found that 
understanding action might be related to goal and intention understanding. Infants are 
sensitive to the biological motions of others and research has shown this infant ability 
to perceive discrepancies when the motion is interrupted. In a study by Baldwin, 
Baird, Saylor and Clark (2001), a woman was shown reaching to pick up a cloth towel 
that was on the floor. Using a looking time paradigm they examined whether 10- to 
11-month-old infants would look longer when a pause was inserted during a scene 
where the woman was half way between reaching and grasping the towel or whether 
they would look longer at the scene where the pause was inserted at the end of the 
completed action of the woman successfully picking up the towel and hanging it from 
a rail. Their hypothesis was confirmed as infants in this study looked longer at the 
video which had the pause at the moment when the woman was going to perform her 
intention, i.e., grasp the towel. These researchers suggested two types of 
explanations, a low level and a high level explanation as an account of their results. 
The high level explanation is in terms of an understanding of the actor’s intention and
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the goal that she has, which they see as arising in a top-down manner. On the other 
hand, the low-level explanation involves perceptual skills and so in this interrupted 
intention video they might expect the person to locate the object, initiate contact with 
it and then release it, an explanation that is regarded as identifying structure in action. 
These researchers believe both these mechanisms are involved in children’s 
understanding in this study and propose that the low-level perceptual mechanism 
might be a prerequisite for the higher-level intention inference mechanism (Baird & 
Baldwin, 2001).
This distinction between being aware of something only in perceptual terms 
and understanding something in a more inferential manner has received attention by 
different researchers. One of the problems that the account of perceptual structure 
faces is that the amount of intentional behaviour that an infant will come across varies 
in great extent. There are ample studies that have shown that similar actions can 
indicate the same intention unless they are followed with a verbal or nonverbal 
indication as to the intention of the person performing that action (Carpenter, Akhtar 
& Tomasello, 1998). Therefore it seems difficult for such an account to encompass 
the different intentional actions and behaviours that people elicit.
1.12 Perception of goals
On the other hand researchers who subscribe to a different school of thought 
propose that intention understanding arises later in development, around the age of 9 
months and it develops in conjunction to joint attention processes and the ability to 
form triadic interactions between the infant, another person and an object. These 
researchers propose that an understanding of intentions derives from an understanding 
about goals. An extended amount of research has established that infants and
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children interpret behaviour in terms of goals (Carpenter et al., 1998; Carpenter, Call, 
& Tomasello, 2005; Meltzoff, 1995; Gattis, Bekkering & Wohlschlager, 2002).
Gattis et al. (2002) suggest that the studies on infants’ understanding of intentions 
reveal that infants interpret behaviour in terms of goals, the mental, nonobserved 
inferences that one draws and which guide one’s behaviour. A lot of these studies 
were conducted using the behavioural re-enactment procedure where infants are 
reproducing the direct understanding of their observation, and as the findings indicate, 
infant^ reproduce the outcome that the experimenter is trying to achieve rather than 
the surface behaviour that might arise out of an accidental or unsuccessful attempt to 
reach that outcome (Carpenter et al, 1998; Meltzoff, 2002). For example, in the 
Carpenter et al. (1998) and Meltzoff (1995) studies infants saw an adult perform 
actions that were indicated as accidental or intentional (either with lexical cues or 
hand movements) and the infants were able to correctly perform on the task because 
they relied on observable information such as the direction of movement and the 
adult’s words or nonverbal exclamations in order to pull out meaning about the 
nonobservable intentions of the adult (Gattis, 2002). In these studies therefore, infants 
were able to draw inferences based on what the experimenter’s goal was and whether 
it was achieved or not. In the case of the experimenter in the Meltzoff study who was 
trying but failing to pull apart a dumbell, the infants inferred the unobserved goal 
which was to separate the dumbell, so when it was their turn on the task, they were 
able to fulfil the goal of separating the two parts. This classic study has often been 
criticised for being aided by stimulus enhancement and emulation learning for the 
affordances of the stimulus (Charman & Huang, 2002). However, other researchers 
have shown that the intention understanding exhibited in this task is found in 18- and 
15-month-olds but not so competently in 12-months-olds, which could question why
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these other forms of social learning are not functioning at the younger age group 
(Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999; Bellagamba, Camaioni & Colonnesi, 2006).
Another study that examined goal understanding in 12- to 18-month-olds 
showed that depending on the context infants attribute different goals to similar 
situations. In particular, Carpenter et al (2005) showed these infants a toy mouse that 
either hopped (with beebeebee sound effects) or slid (with beeeeee sound effects). 
There were also two conditions, a house and a no house condition. In the house 
condition, the infants saw either the hopping or sliding movements of the mouse (with 
sound effects) going into one of two houses. In the no house condition the houses 
were absent so the infants only saw the hopping or sliding (with sound effects). The 
results of this study showed that in the house condition infants interpreted the goal to 
be “putting the mouse into the house” as they ignored the hopping and sliding and 
directly put the mouse in the house. However, in the no house condition, infants 
interpreted the goal to be the “hopping” and “sliding” as infants produced sliding and 
hopping actions and sometimes even the sound effects associated with that. This 
study thus shows that infants’ learning about goals is flexible and their plans of 
actions can change according to their interpretations of goals.
Wellman and Phillips (2001) also suggested that what manifests intentionality 
in behaviour are action directedness and action connectedness. The action 
directedness feature of behaviour refers to the behavioural movements towards certain 
objects but not others such as a hand reaching for a cup. Additionally, action 
connectedness refers to the distinctive connections that go along with intentional 
behaviours, such as a turn of the head and body towards the cup and a happy facial 
expression at reaching the cup or a negative expression at not being able to reach the 
cup. These facial expressions may be supplemented with vocal expressions such as
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“Yes!” or “Oh!” Researchers suggest that action directedness arises earlier than 
action connectedness (Phillips, Wellman, & Spelke, 2002; Wellman & Phillips, 2001; 
Woodward, 1999). These emotional-cognitive reactions (as Wellman and Phillips
(2001) call these facial, verbal and vocal expressions), together with the object 
directedness (such as the hand reaching for a cup) are what manifest and identify 
intentions. Some recent studies seem to reinforce this argument. In a study, Behne, 
Carpenter, Call and Tomasello (2005) had an experimenter hand toys to 9-, 12- and 
18-month-olds and they found that infants became more impatient when the 
experimenter was unwilling to give them a toy, by teasing them (e.g., by smiling in a 
teasing way). On the contrary, infants who had seen the experimenter trying but 
being unable to give them the toy, because she accidentally dropped it (e.g., by having 
a facial expression of surprise and frustration), appeared to be less impatient. This 
study also examined the responses of 6-month-olds but found that infants at this age 
were not able to differentiate between unwilling and unable actions. The conclusion 
drawn from this study is similar to the abovementioned findings, which point out that 
infants as young as nine months are able to understand the goal-directed actions of an 
adult, and the facial expressions connected to this.
Another important aspect of goal understanding in infancy arises from the 
ability to use communicative intentions. For example, in a study 14-, 18- and 24- 
month-olds saw an adult either pointing or gazing towards a box to indicate that there 
was a toy hiding inside the box, or pointing and gazing but in an absentminded nature 
(noncommunicative) towards the box. This study found that in the communicative 
intention conditions children of all age groups were able to correctly find the hidden 
toy. In comparison, when the experimenter was pointing or gazing in a 
noncommunicative way, the children searched equally at both locations (Behne,
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Carpenter & Tomasello, 2005). This study shows that in understanding 
communicative intentions, infants display an understanding of others as intentional 
being who have intentions and who will communicate those to another being. It also 
emphasises the significant difference between low level attentional cuing processes 
such as noncommuncative points and gazes and the influential effect of a similar point 
of a communicative nature. This knowledge of communicative intentions is therefore 
very important for infants, as it contributes to their awareness of why people do and 
enhances their attempts to make sense of the world (Behne et al., 2005).
1.13 Tomasello et al’s model of intentionality
One model for intention understanding has been posed by Michael Tomasello. 
This thesis focuses on this model because it is the most complete model which 
explains intention understanding and its development and there is ample data to 
support this developmental model. Tomasello proposes that human infants develop 
skills of shared intentionality within the first and second year of their lives. They do 
so by their capacity to understand others as animate, goal directed and intentional 
agents who have a species specific motivation to share emotions, experience and 
activities with other people (Tomasello et al, 2005). According to Tomasello and his 
colleagues, what distinguishes us from nonhuman primates is not our ability to 
perceive others as having intentions or having attentional states, but rather our 
motivation to share our intentions with others and thus participate in shared 
intentionality which is an integral part of our human culture.
Although this model focuses primarily on intention understanding as it arises 
around the first year, it also attempts to explain the developmental progression from 
early infancy to early childhood, and in addition it describing how this intention
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understanding develops from understanding others as intentional beings to 
communicating and sharing intentions. The advancement of understanding others as 
intentional beings begins from an understanding of animate actions such as self- 
propelling actions and motion, and slowly perceiving actions as being directed 
towards objects and people in the world. In turn, this understanding becomes more 
sophisticated as infants begin to understand that people attend to things. Around the 
age of 9 months infants also become capable of joint attention themselves which 
allows them to become more socially and cognitively involved with other people and 
their surroundings. This understanding then grows as infants begin to understand that 
people have goals associated with aspects of their environment, and that they will 
work towards the achievement of these goals. When gaining an understanding of 
goals infants also gain knowledge about intentions or the plan of action towards the 
goal. Understanding that people are intentional and that they have distinct intentions 
that they direct towards the accomplishment of their goals gives infants a more 
complete awareness about why people act in certain ways in different contexts 
(Tomasello et al, 2005). In learning about culture Tomasello and colleagues proposed 
that infants may learn from others around them by using different forms of social 
learning, depending on their inferences about others behaviour, such as they might use 
imitation to copy salient behaviour that might be beneficial to them in different 
contexts.
1.14 Understanding intentions measured through imitation
Infants* understanding of the intentions of others has often been demonstrated 
in studies that use imitation paradigms to assess what infants understand. Imitation is 
one of the mechanisms of social or observational learning and is important because it
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allows infants to acquire skills efficiently unlike other types of learning such as 
associative learning. Want and Harris (2002) explicate different types of social 
learning, among them local enhancement, stimulus enhancement, emulation, mimicry 
and imitation. Local enhancement refers to the interest brought about in a particular 
location where one has seen another performing an action. Stimulus enhancement 
refers to the interest that is instigated from the object being used to obtain a certain 
goal. Emulation learning is concerned with learning about the properties of objects or 
the causal relations between objects, as in the case for example of a chimpanzee 
watching how termites are extracted though putting a stick down a termite mound. In 
watching this the chimpanzee can understand something about the affordances of the 
stick (being long and lean) and also may understand something about the causal 
relations involved in the situation, for example that termites get attached to the stick 
when that enters the mound. By emulation learning then, chimpanzees can choose 
their own object with similar properties and carry out similar actions (Want & Harris,
2002). Mimicry involves copying actions without necessarily knowing or 
understanding the goal behind those actions. Imitation on the other hand entails that 
the person imitating has an understanding of the overall goal and the specific 
intentions or plan of action for achieving that goal.
Imitation is a very powerful tool in developmental psychology because it is 
one of the nonverbal procedures that allow us to establish what it is that infants are 
aware of. Imitation is particularly important in assessing intention understanding as 
studies have shown that children copy differently depending on their understanding of 
the task, the goals and mental states that they infer from the demonstrations. For 
example, through the use of imitation paradigms we have learned that infants interpret 
the behaviour of people as rational as a study by Gergely, Bekkering and Kiraly
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(2002) has shown. In this study an experimenter turned on a push light that was on a 
table with the use of her forehead. This experimenter sat on a chair in front of the 
light and then leaned and turned the light on with her forehead. There were two 
conditions in this study. In one condition the experimenter had her hand free and laid 
them on the side of the box where the touch light was on, whereas in the other 
condition her hands were occupied because she had a blanket on her shoulders and 
she was holding together the two parts of the blanket. Fourteen-month-old infants 
who had seen the hands free demonstration turned the light on with their forehead. 
The infants who had seen the hands-occupied demonstration turned the light on with 
their hands. The researchers concluded that infants in the hands free condition 
considered the goal of the experimenter as to turn on the light with her forehead since 
she had her hands free but decided not to use them. On the other hand, the infants 
who saw the hands-occupied demonstration interpreted the goal as turning on the 
light, but because the experimenter’s hands were not free since she was holding the 
blanket, and because their hands were free, they used their hands to turn on the light. 
Therefore, the infants interpreted the goal of the experimenter and used rational 
imitation to achieve this inferred goal. The results of this study were recently 
replicated with younger children, 12-month-olds who selectively copied the intentions 
of an experimenter depending on whether the experimenter was able or not (Schwier, 
van Maanen, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2006).
Similarly, in the study mentioned by Carpenter et al (2005) the infants 
imitated differently according to their understanding of the goal. Thus when there 
was a house present, infants as young as 12 months imitated differently according to 
the goal they inferred in each condition. In the no house condition they interpreted the 
goal to be the specific hopping movements and sounds, whereas in the house
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condition, they interpreted the goal to be putting the dog into the house and because of 
this infants did not imitate or copy the hopping movements and sounds. Studies with 
older children also reveal that understanding goals and intentions and using imitation 
to match those goals and intentions is something that happens throughout childhood.
Overview of Thesis
1.15 Summary of previous research and open questions
The findings examined thus far testify to the important role that an 
understanding of intentions has on the developing infant and how the perception of 
acoustics becomes a more sophisticated source of information that contributes to 
communication in the lives of young infants. However, despite a lot of research some 
questions still remain unanswered. For example, we know that infants are sensitive to 
the tone of voice from birth and that they are able to discriminate between different 
acoustical characteristics. At the same time we know that infants are very sensitive to 
various physical properties of the world such as object shape and size, and sounds 
objects make among other things. What we are still unclear about is whether infants 
are able to evaluate and infer the behaviours of others, and more specifically 
intonation, and whether they use this to come to a realisation about other people’s 
intentions. Taking into account the important role the tone of voice plays in the life of 
the developing infant, it is important to examine first whether infants can use the tone 
of voice to infer another person’s intention and secondly to examine what aspects of 
the tone of voice it is that infants find salient and which allow them to interpret these 
intentions.
30
1.16 Aims of thesis
This thesis will investigate the development of an understanding of intentions 
as expressed through the tone of voice. In particular it will examine whether infants 
can understand the mental states of others when they are expressing purposeful acts 
and accidental acts through intonation. In addition the thesis will examine mimicry 
and imitation and will look for differences in the instrumental and social functions in 
which infants use mimicry and imitation. Finally, the thesis will examine the 
understanding of mental states from intonation in a looking time study and compare 
the findings to those of an imitation paradigm.
1.17 Experimental paradigms and studies
This thesis will utilize two different experimental paradigms. In order to 
observe intention understanding we drew on an existing paradigm that successfully 
investigated infant responses on toys that resulted in a fun outcome. This paradigm is 
an imitation or behavioural re-enactment paradigm which posits that children will 
copy actions according to the understanding about their meaning. Carpenter, et al. 
(1998) used this paradigm and found that 14- to 18-month-olds were able to 
distinguish between intentional and accidental actions. The second paradigm utilised 
in this thesis is a looking time paradigm. This method has been used extensively with 
young infants and has revealed capacities in infants at a younger age than imitation 
paradigms do.
The second chapter of this thesis will examine 14- to 18-month-olds’ 
understanding of intentions through verbal cues and intonation. The first study will 
be a replication of the Carpenter et al. (1998) with the verbal cues of “Whoops” and 
“There” to establish the finding for the use of this paradigm. The second study will
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examine an understanding of intentions but through nonverbal, vocal cues by using 
foreign words and intonation as an indication of intentional and accidental behaviour. 
The third chapter will look at 14- to 18-month-olds’ understanding of intentions from 
intonation but with an altered version of the Carpenter et al. study. This study will 
assess intention understanding through pre-recorded demonstrations in an attempt for 
better control in the presentation of specific vocal cues that have been pre-rated by 
adults. The fourth chapter will examine more closely what 18-month-old infants find 
salient when making judgements about the intentions of others and in particular it will 
look at the role that valence might have on the children’s responses. Finally, the fifth 
experimental chapter will look at intention understanding in 14-month-olds using a 
looking time paradigm and how this relates to actual performance on an imitation 
task.
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CHAPTER 2: INFERRING INTENTIONS FROM INTONATION: 
EVIDENCE FROM IMITATION OF LIVE DEMONSTRATIONS
2.1 Introduction
Ever since the term theory o f mind was coined by Premack and Woodruff in 
1978, a wealth of developmental studies has investigated the trajectory of when 
children begin to attribute mental states to themselves and others around them. Recent 
advancements in nonverbal methods have established evidence for some aspects of 
mental state understanding in children as young as nine months (Behne, Carpenter, 
Call & Tomasello, 2005; Carpenter, Call & Tomasello, 2005).However, we still have 
little understanding of how children begin to attribute mental states, such as 
intentions, desires and beliefs to other people. The aim of the current set of studies 
was to investigate the contribution of intonation cues to infants’ understanding of 
mental states.
One well-documented set of cues that infants use to infer mental states is 
visual information about other people’s bodily actions, and the consequences of those 
actions. Habituation studies have shown that infants as young as 6 months are 
perceptive to goal directed hand movements (Woodward 1999). A second possibility 
is that infants can also use facial cues to infer others’ intentions (Olineck & Poulin- 
Dubois, 2005).
The set of studies presented here investigate a second possibility, that infants 
use acoustic information, in particular the prosodic features of human speech, to infer 
mental states. Prosody (or intonation) encompasses several acoustic characteristics of 
speech, such as pitch, intensity, and duration that convey meaning, attitudes, and 
emotions (Cruttenden, 1997; Ladd, Silverman, Tolkmitt, Bergmann & Scherer, 1985).
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Prosody also facilitates word segmentation (Thiessen, Hill & Saffran, 2005). Based on 
this evidence, and studies demonstrating that infants are responsive to human speech 
(Femald, 1985,1991,1992), we reasoned that prosody might also underlie 
inferencing about intentions. Although infants can use facial cues to infer intentions 
(Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2005), studies of social referencing suggest that vocal 
cues might be more informative to infants than facial cues as they have a greater 
effect at regulating infant behavior (Mumme, Femald & Herrera, 1996; Vaish & 
Striano, 2004).
We utilized a paradigm developed by Carpenter, Akhtar and Tomasello (1998) 
to investigate toddlers’ imitation and intentions. The Carpenter et al study examined 
whether infants between the ages of 14 to 18 months are able to distinguish between 
intentional and accidental actions. In their study, an experimenter performed two 
actions on a toy. The accidental actions were indicated with “Woops!” and the 
purposeful actions with “There!” Carpenter et al found that infants reproduced more 
intentional than accidental actions. This paradigm allowed us to compare the 
contribution of lexical and intonational cues to infants’ understanding of others’ 
intentions. We hypothesized that infants will utilize the information conveyed by the 
intonation cues and would thus produce more actions indicated by the intentional 
intonation compared to actions indicated by the accidental intonation.
Study 1: Lexical Cues
In order to evaluate the methodology used in the Carpenter et al. (1998) study 
we carried out a replication of their study. We wanted to focus on the Accidental- 
Intentional (A-I) and Intentional-Accidental (I-A) conditions so we excluded the 
Intentional-Intentional condition.
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2.2 Method
2.2.1 Participants
Twenty-two infants (10 boys, 12 girls) between the ages of 14 months, 10 
days and 18 months, 20 days (M = 16 months, 15 days) participated in the study. 
Another 6 infants began the procedure but were not included in the final sample 
because two grew restless and four had English as a second language and we wanted 
to test the lexical cues study on infants who were native English speakers. Five more 
children were excluded due to experimenter error, parental interference or toy 
malfunction. Parents lived in the city of Cardiff, Wales and its suburbs. Seventeen 
participants were recruited by telephone from a list of participants who had expressed 
interest in participating in a study. These children were tested in a child-friendly lab at 
Cardiff University. An additional 5 participants were tested at a children’s cafe. As 
acknowledgement for participation, infants were given a t-shirt.
2.2.2 Materials
Five novel toys (four for the experimental part and one for the warm-up part) 
were constructed from wooden boxes and plastic and iron items. As in the Carpenter 
et al. (1998) study, these toys afforded two actions which were followed by an 
interesting result, such as a puppet in a window (the end-result). The toys were 
constructed in such a way so that they only required one experimenter to produce the 
end-result. The toys and end-results can be seen in the Appendix. The experimenter 
manipulated the action items that were mounted on the front of the toy with the left 
hand and discreetly operated the end-result in the back of the toy with the right hand.
35
2.2.3 Design
The design for this study was similar to Carpenter et al. (1998). Two actions 
were modeled on each toy. Accidental actions were immediately followed by the 
word “Whoops!” and intentional actions by the word “There!” both in the appropriate 
accidental and intentional intonation. There were two conditions in the study, an I-A 
condition where the first action was indicated as intentional and the second accidental 
and an A-I condition where the first action was accidental and the second intentional. 
Each infant participated in each condition twice. The order of intention and accident 
was counterbalanced across trials. There were 4 orders and in each of the orders any 
given toy was presented in a different position. In addition, the order in which the 
actions were presented and the condition in which they were presented were 
counterbalanced. For example, in the puppet toy, sometimes the rolling action was 
first and was indicated as intentional or accidental and sometimes the lifting action 
was first and was indicated as intentional or accidental, depending on the condition. 
Each infant observed the demonstration of each toy twice and had the chance to 
produce those actions twice.
2.2.4 Procedure
During the study, infants sat on their mother’s lap in front of a table. The toys 
were kept under that table. There were two cameras in the room. One camera focused 
on a profile view of the infant from the waist up. The second camera captured both 
the experimenter and infant. The experimenter sat on the side of the table near the 
child. Infants first played with the warm-up toy where the experimenter modeled an 
action on the toy and music followed. There were no verbal cues during this 
demonstration. Sometimes children were reluctant to touch the toy so the
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experimenter encouraged those children by saying “Can you make it work?” If 
children still did not reproduce the action then the experimenter used manual coaching 
for these children until they were able to do it alone, or with the help of the 
experimenter.
During the test phase, the experimenter modeled two actions on each toy. The 
actions had a short delay between them and were enacted rapidly in order to appear' 
credible. For example, in the Intentional-Accidental condition, with the puppet toy, 
the experimenter first did the rolling action and said “There” in a purposeful and 
satisfied tone of voice. Second she did the pushing action and said “Whoops” in a 
dissatisfied and surprised intonation. The end-result was a puppet that danced in a 
window for about a half to one second after the second action. Following the 
demonstration infants were given a turn to produce a response. The same actions were 
modeled a second time and the infant again had a turn to produce a response. 
Therefore, children saw 8 demonstrations and had 8 response trials. The end-result 
was presented approximately half to 1 second after the second action. During the 
children’s responses, the end-result was activated only if the child had reproduced the 
intentional action, but regardless of whether the infant had also reproduced an 
accidental action. The end-result followed between 1 to 2 seconds after performing 
the intentional action. Throughout the testing, although the infants were looking at 
the hand actions, the experimenter maintained a positive but neutral facial expression. 
2.2.5 Scoring
Infants’ responses were scored following the session from the video recording. 
For each of the 8 trials the children were scored for reproducing the Intentional action 
only, the Accidental action only, both actions in Order, both actions in Incorrect 
Order, and neither action.
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2.3 Results
The first analysis looked at infants’ tendencies to reproduce all kinds of 
actions, not just the correct intentional actions alone. Therefore, this analysis took into 
account the overall number of accidental actions and intentional actions performed by 
the children. For the analyses, the two conditions (A-I and I-A) were collapsed 
together. The actions that children had performed were divided by the number of valid 
trials that children had responded to.(usually 8) and then converted to percentages. A 
2 (actions: intentional vs. accidental) x 2 (age: younger than 16 months, 15 days vs. 
older children) mixed model repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on the 
percentages. The analysis found no difference between age groups, F(1,20) = 3.09, p 
>.09, r\= .13. However, there was a significant difference between the two actions. 
Overall, infants reproduced more intentional (M = 67.73, SD = 17.76) than accidental 
actions (M= 48.37, SD = 19.10), F(1,20) = 7.22, p <.01, r\= .27.
The second analysis examined the children’s responses more closely. This 
analysis drew comparisons between the correct intentional only responses and the 
three wrong responses, i.e., accidental actions only, actions performed in order and 
actions performed in the incorrect order. The results of the paired samples t-test 
revealed an overall significant difference between the intentional and accidental 
actions, /(21) = 2.75,/?<.01. Means and additional analyses can be seen in Table 2.1.
Additional reliability analyses were carried out, where a naive coder scored 6 
videos. This coding was compared to the scores produced by the experimenter. The 
result of the Cohen kappa test was excellent at .93. Halfway through the study 
another coder looked at 6 videos with the volume off and rated whether the actions of 
the experimenter, as well as the facial expressions were intentional or accidental. The 
results of this analysis showed that the coder was correct 58% of the time. When the
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coder responded correctly the infants also responded correctly 57% of the time and 
when the coder responded incorrectly, the infants responded correctly 40% of the 
time. A chi-square analysis was carried out to see if there was any association 
between the actions produced by infants and the actions identified as intentional and 
accidental by the coder. The result of this analysis was not significant/2 (1) = 1.26, p  
> .26 which suggests that infants were focusing on the words when performing the 
task.
2.4 Discussion
The findings of this study replicate those of Carpenter et al. (1998). Infants in 
this study reproduced more intentional actions than accidental actions. The findings 
suggest that infants were able to use lexical and/or intonation cues to infer and 
discriminate which action were intentional or accidental. In the following study we 
examined whether infants are able to discriminate intentional from accidental actions 
based on intonation cues alone.
Study 2: Intonation Cues
In the second study, we wanted to examine whether intonation alone is enough 
to guide infants as to the intentionality of two similar actions. In this study we used 
the Greek words “Ochi” and “Nato” with appropriate accidental and intentional 
intonations to mark the two actions on the toys. In order to eliminate any possibility 
that lexical characteristics of the Greek words affect intention understanding, half of 
the infants heard “Ochi” as intentional and “Nato” as accidental, whereas the other 
half heard “Ochi” as accidental and “Nato” as intentional. Our hypothesis was that
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infants would be able to use these intonation cues in order to distinguish an accidental 
from an intentional action.
2.5 Method
2.5.1 Participants
Forty-one infants (19 boys, 22 girls) between the ages of 14 months, 0 days 
and 18 months 15, days (M = 16 months, 8 days) participated in the study. Another 4 
infants were tested but grew restless so they were excluded from the study. Eight 
more infants were excluded due to experimenter error, parental interference, or toy 
malfunction. Participants we recruited as in Study 1 and were tested in a child friendly 
lab at Cardiff University. Infants received a t-shirt for participation.
2.5.2 Materials and Design
The materials in this study were the same five toys used in the first study. The 
design was the same as in Study 1.
2.5.3 Procedure and Scoring
The procedure for this second study was the same as Study 1 with the 
difference that infants heard the lexical items “Ochi” and “Nato” instead of “Whoops” 
and “There.” Twenty-one infants participated in the condition where “Nato” was 
expressed as intentional and “Ochi” as accidental. Another 20 infants participated in 
the reverse condition where “Ochi” was intentional and “Nato” was accidental. Infant 
responses were scored as in Study 1. As in Carpenter et al., the words were uttered in 
such a way that the intentional intonation sounded like the experimenter meant to do 
the action and was satisfied (falling intonation pattern), whereas the accidental
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intonation expressed dissatisfaction and surprise (rising intonation pattern). Figures of 
these patterns are shown in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.1 Typical pitch contour for intentional intonations
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Figure 2.2 Typical pitch contour for accidental intonations
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2.6 Results
The analyses used in the second study were similar to those in the first study. 
The first analysis looked at infants’ tendencies to reproduce all kinds of actions, not 
just the correct intentional actions alone. A 2 (actions: intentional vs. accidental) x 2 
(age: younger than 16 months, 8 days vs. older children) x 2 (condition: Nato-Ochi vs. 
Ochi-Nato) mixed model repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on the 
percentages. The results revealed no difference between the younger (M= 61.46, SD 
= 23.85) and the older children (M = 61.50, SD = 18.60% F( 1, 37) = .01, p >.09, r\= 
.001. However, there was a significant difference between the two actions. Overall, 
infants reproduced more intentional (M -  75.37, SD = 19.41) than accidental actions 
(M= 47.58, SD = 23.71% F( 1, 37) = 19.71, p <.001, ri= .35. The results also revealed 
a nonsignificant interaction between age and actions, F(1, 37) = 3.44, p >.07, rj= .09. 
Finally, there was no effect of condition, F (l, 37) = .18, p >.67, r|= .01.
The second analysis drew comparisons between the correct intentional only 
responses and the three wrong responses, and age. A paired samples t-test revealed an 
overall significant difference between the intentional and accidental actions, f(40) = 
4.69, p<.00\. Means and additional comparisons can be seen in Table 1.1. Additional 
analyses (with Bonferroni corrections) were carried out for the two age groups 
separately. For the younger group there was no significant difference between the 
intentional (M= 46.97, SD = 27.07) and accidental actions (M= 30.11, SD = 20.63% 
f(18) = 1.74,/?>.10. However, there was a significant difference between intentional 
(M = 57.12, SD = 19.82) and accidental actions (M= 19.88, SD = 17.38) for older 
children, t(2\) = 5.48, /?<.001.
Another analysis was carried out to control for the possibility of learning 
throughout the 8 trials. Analyses were conducted on just the first trial children saw.
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Wilcoxon tests were carried out and the results were nonsignificant between 
intentional (M = .44, SD = .50) and accidental actions (M = .30, SD = .46), z = - .96, p  
> .34 but significant for the comparisons between intentional actions and actions 
performed in order (M = .08, SD = .27), z = -2.98, p  < .01 and in incorrect order (M= 
.16, SD = .37), z = -2.13, p  < .03. When comparing between the younger and older 
children separately, the results revealed a significant difference between intentional 
(M =.63, SD = .50) and accidental actions (M =.15, SD = .37) for the older group (z = 
-2.32, p  < .02), but no significant difference between intentional (M = .24, SD = .44) 
and accidental actions (M = A l, SD = .51) in the younger group (z = -1.15, p > .25).
Table 2.1
Infant’s Overall Percent Reproduction in Studies 1 and 2 and how They Differ 
From the Correct Intentional Actions. *p  < .05. ** p < .001
Actions Mean Standard Deviation
Study 1 Study 2 Study 1 Study 2
Intentional 51.63 52.42 19.10 23.71
Accidental 32.27* 24.63** 17.76 19.41
Order 8.71** 11.74** 11.92 14.24
Incorrect
order
7.39** 10.38** 11.35 14.56
Additional reliability analyses were carried out, where a naive coder scored 12 
videos, 6 for each condition. This coding was compared to the scores produced by the 
experimenter. The result of the Cohen kappa test was excellent at .92. Halfway
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through the study another coder looked at 12 videos with the volume off and rated 
whether the actions of the experimenter, as well as the facial expressions were 
intentional or accidental. The results of this analysis showed that the coder was 
correct 48% of the time. When the coder responded correctly the infants also 
responded correctly 54% of the time and when the coder responded incorrectly, the 
infants responded correctly 47% of the time. A chi-square analysis was carried out to 
see if there was any association between the actions produced by infants and the 
actions identified as intentional and accidental by the coder. The result of this 
analysis was not significant^ (1) = .67,/? > .41.
An additional analysis was utilised to look at possible differences in 
performance between the first and second study. This was a 2 (actions: intentional vs. 
accidental) x 2(study: lexical study vs. intonation study) mixed model repeated 
measures ANOVA. The results of the analysis were nonsignificant. There were no 
significant differences between the lexical and intonation studies, F( 1, 61) = 1.78, p 
>.19, r|= .03. There was also no interaction F(l, 61) = .78, p >.39, ly* .01. This 
analysis suggests that infants take intentionality into account despite it being 
expressed in words or intonation.
2.6.1 Intonation Analyses
Intonation analyses were carried out on a sample of utterances from the two 
conditions. Four utterances were taken from each of the first 29 participant sessions. 
Two intentional utterances and 2 accidental utterances were randomly taken from 
each of the 29 sessions for analysis. The analyses compared the mean pitch (Hz), the 
pitch range, the duration and the amplitude (db) of accidental and intentional 
utterances. Pairwise comparisons found significant differences between intentional
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and accidental intonations. For the mean Fo, the intentional intonations were higher 
than the accidental intonations (t (57) = 17.66,/? < .001) and so was the amplitude (t 
(57) = 20.86,/? < .001) and the duration (t (57) = 11.25,/? < .001) for the intentional 
intonations. The pitch range however was greater for the accidental intonations (t 
(57) = -4.21,/?<.001).
2.7 Discussion
Infants in this study were able to use the vocal cues of the Greek words, 
enabling them to reproduce more intentional actions than accidental actions. The 
results suggest that intonation is a valid cue to intention by 16 months.
2.9 General Discussion
The aim of these studies was to explore the validity of intonation as a cue to 
understanding other’s intentions for infants between the ages of 14 to 18 months. In 
these two studies, infants saw demonstrations where an experimenter performed two 
actions on toys and marked those actions as intentional or accidental. In the first 
study, the actions were marked by “There!” expressed with intentional intonation, or 
“Woops!” expressed with accidental intonation. In the second study actions were 
marked with Greek words, produced with intentional or accidental intonation. The 
results of these two studies together indicate that infants are able to infer intentions 
from intonation alone.
From an early age, infants seem to be sensitive to the tone of voice in 
communication (Femald, 1985; 1991; 1992). These current studies have shown that 
this sensitivity can turn into a more sophisticated ability at around 16 months, the 
ability to gather information about what others intend and do not intend in their
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interactions with inanimate objects. The results of the second study demonstrate that 
infants are able to understand which of two perceptually similar actions, was 
intentional based on intonation cues alone.
This study’s significance lays in the fact that intonation on its own, dissociated 
from facial or lexical cues can still provide infants with the necessary information 
about another person’s mental state. The results of the second study therefore 
contribute to the already expanding literature on the importance of intonation in the 
life of young children.
The capability to infer intentions paired with the sensitivity to intonation 
information allows toddlers to gain new insights into the mental states of others, and 
thus the ability to interpret behavior. This is not surprising when one considers that 
human infants are raised within stimulating environments where linguistic and 
prosodic attempts to communication begin at a stage in development where infants are 
still unable to make sense of them. One interesting finding is that infants around 16 
months of age begin to change their focus from relying on prosody to relying on their 
newly acquired vocabulary (Friend, 2001). It has been suggested that this deviation 
from prosodic to linguistic reliance is brought about by intonation itself as studies 
have shown that the tone of voice is important in highlighting crucial words that could 
potentially signify intentions to infants (Femald & Mazzie, 1991; Grassmann & 
Tomasello, 2007).
Although the results of the current studies show that infants are sensitive to 
intentionality in the tone of voice, further studies are needed to examine whether 
infants infer mental states from different types of vocal cues. An interesting contrast 
would be to examine whether infants can infer and discriminate intentional and
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accidental actions when these are expressed with similar valence, or whether infants 
rely on a contrast between positive and negative valence to infer intentions.
The question of what specific cues infants use to discriminate mental states 
relates to a larger question about the universality of the information available from 
intonation. For example, Femald (1993) has found that the intonational signature of 
different communicative messages such as prohibition and approvals seems to be 
similar in different languages (English, German, and Italian) but not so similar in 
Japanese. More recently, another study looked at such communicative messages and 
their identification by a population of an indigenous culture (Bryant & Barrett, 2007). 
Similar results about vocal emotion discrimination were found in 9 different countries 
by Scherer, Banse and Wallbott (2001).
Understanding intentions is regarded an early gateway towards mental state 
understanding more generally (Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003). The current results 
show that infants can infer intentions from intonation, thus demonstrating the 
importance of intonation in understanding mental states.
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CHAPTER 3: INFERRING INTENTIONS FROM INTONATION: 
EVIDENCE FROM PRE-RECORDED DEMONSTRATIONS
3.1 Introduction
In our previous studies (Chapter 2) we examined the ability of infants from 14 
to 18 months in a task that elicited their understanding of intentions. These two 
studies were conducted using a live demonstration from the experimenter and a 
subsequent response from the infants. Although the results of these studies were in 
accordance with the hypotheses, we wanted to replicate these results by adding 
greater control and consistency in aspects of the study, such as the intonations used 
and any additional cues that might have been unconsciously given during the 
demonstration period, such as facial cues and the timing between the actions.
Another goal of this study was to develop a methodology that could be used for 
measuring intention understanding in a looking time study such as the one described 
in Chapter 5. In order to accomplish these aims we video-recorded the 
demonstrations. This allowed us to gain more consistency, and in addition to create 
further experiments with these recordings, such as those described in Chapter 4 and 5. 
This gave us more control over what the infants saw and heard, and allowed us to also 
examine whether infants can exhibit a similar understanding of intentions in a video­
recorded session.
Video-recorded paradigms have been proposed to be more difficult for infants 
because they posit more difficulties when representing the information presented in 
the video compared to live demonstrations. Studies that have examined infant 
behaviour in paradigms that have presented information to infants through video in 
comparison to information presented through live demonstration suggest that infants
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display a “video deficit effect” (Anderson & Pempek, 2005). Studies such as the ones 
by Hayne and colleagues have found that infants and young children imitate more 
actions following a 24 hour delay when these actions had been demonstrated live 
rather than through video (Barr & Hayne, 1999; Hayne, Herbert & Simcock, 2003). 
Other researchers have found similar findings in children’s dual representation 
abilities as young children (two and a half years) have been found to have difficulties 
retrieving a toy that was hidden in a room when the hiding procedure was presented 
through video. However, when they had seen the hiding process from a window 
facing directly into the room, these children were able to retrieve the object (Troseth 
& DeLoache, 1998; Schmitt & Anderson, 2002). In addition to this, Pierroutsakos 
and Troseth (2003) found that when 9-, 14- and 19-month-olds were presented with 
an array of objects on TV, the younger ones tended to attempt to manipulate the 
objects by patting and hitting them whereas the 19-month-olds used more directive 
behaviour, such as pointing to the objects.
Although the abovementioned results propose that infants and young children 
have difficulty representing information from video, some other research has shown 
that younger infants are able to encode the information from video, and in particular 
they seem to be able to use this information in imitation paradigms instead of object 
search paradigms (Deocampo & Hudson, 2003; Meltzoff, 1988). Deocampo and 
Hudson (2003) have suggested that imitation tasks are different from object search 
tasks in that they do not require dual representation competence as “it is not necessary 
to realize there is a specific referent to the video representation that is occurring in 
current reality to imitate or to be reminded by the representation” (p. 232). In this 
study they used a similar setup to Troseth and DeLoache (1998) but instead of a 
retrieval task they utilised a goal-imitation task where children had to imitate finding
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a toy but they also had a goal why they had to find the particular toy. The results of 
the study indicate that 24-month olds were better at the imitation task when this 
included a goal, but they still performed badly when the toy retrieval task 
incorporated a goal. Following these results, we proposed that the intention 
understanding task in our study might be imitated similarly as in the live 
demonstrations.
In recording the demonstrations in this study we purposefully did not include 
the face of the demonstrator because we wanted to see whether infants could still do 
the study when the face and the gaze cues were not available to them. Gaze research 
indicates that infants are able to follow gaze from a young age but it is not until they 
enter their second year that they become able to interpret gaze as a communicative 
cue. At around the age of 12 months eye gaze gives infants indications of a person’s 
desire, such as whether a person looking at a toy will reach towards that toy instead of 
another toy that the person did not gaze towards (Woodward, 2003). Researchers 
using this paradigm conclude that towards the end of their first year, infants have 
expectations about action goals indicated by an actor’s gaze direction and reaching 
and grasping movements. This understanding of intentionality begins to develop 
further when infants enter their second year, as infants become able to understand that 
gazing alone (no grasping), along with emotional expressions,can be the result of a 
person’s desire for an object (Bama & Legerstee, 2005; Phillips et al., 2002; 
Repacholi, 1998) or an intention to acquire an object (Sodian & Thoermer, 2004; 
Woodward, 2003).
Despite not providing any facial or gaze cues in this study, we believe that 
children would still be able to perform on the basis of the intonation alone as we 
found in our previous study. Also, research has shown that infants are sensitive to
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hand actions and they are able to discriminate between specific purposeful and 
nonpurposeful actions (Woodward, 1999). Consequently, because we wanted to 
control for the intentionality of hand movements, we recorded the actions on the toys 
in a way that they appeared neutral, in order that they did not give any cues as to 
whether they were intentional or accidental.
The results of the previous intonation study also showed that the younger 
infants in the group had more difficulty making the distinction between the intentional 
and accidental intonation. One possibility for this might be the pace at which the 
actions were presented. The rationale was to present these actions rather rapidly in 
order for them to appear credible. However, in this pre-recorded study we wanted to 
intentionally slow the pace down in order to give the younger children more time in 
which to process the intonations and the actions that lead to the goal.
Following the results of the previous intonation study, we wanted to control 
for any cues that might have been unconsciously given during the demonstration 
period, such as facial cues and the timing between the actions. We also wanted to 
have greater control and consistency for the intonations during the utterances. 
Therefore, we video recorded the demonstrations in order to eliminate confounds 
relating to alternative cues. This gave us more control over what the infants saw and 
heard, and allowed us to also examine whether infants can exhibit a similar 
understanding of intentions in a video recorded session, as we saw in live 
demonstration sessions. The ages that were tested in this study were 14-month-olds 
and 17-month-olds.
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Study 1: Seventeen-Month-Olds
3.2 Method.
3.2.1 Pilot Study
A pilot study was run in order to obtain the audio stimuli that were to be used 
in the main study. Twenty adult participants heard 40 utterances. Twenty of the 
utterances were of the word Nato, half of which were expressed with different types 
of intentional intonation and half were expressed with different types of accidental 
intonation. The other twenty utterances were of the word Ochi half of which were 
expressed with different types of intentional intonation and half with accidental 
intonation. The participants were asked to rate whether the intonation sounded 
intentional or accidental. They were further instructed to think of an intentional 
intonation as in the case when the person did an action purposefully and achieved it, 
and for the accidental intentional as in the case when the person did an action which 
they did not mean to do. The results of the pilot study determined the intentional 
intonation for a Nato utterance (85% of participants rated it as intentional) and the 
accidental intonation for Ochi utterance (100% of participants rated it as accidental). 
These two chosen intonations were used throughout the study.
3.2.2 Participants
Twenty infants between the ages of 16 months, 4 days and 18 months, 14 days 
(mean age 17 months, 18 days) took part in this study. The participants were recruited 
by telephone from a list of parents who had expressed interest in participating in a 
study. Parents lived in the city of Cardiff, Wales and its suburbs. As 
acknowledgement for participation, parents were given a t-shirt for their child.
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3.2.3 Materials
The materials consisted of video recordings of five experimental toys and one 
warm up toy. The toys were the same as in study one, with the exception of the fifth 
toy which consisted of a blue pipe handle and a red handle. The end result was in the 
form of a soft chicken toy. The actions on the toys were video recorded and the end 
result was produced by another person who was hidden behind the toy. The video 
recording consisted of the experimenter’s arm and hand which performed the two 
actions with around a 4 second difference between actions. The audio stimuli chosen 
from the pilot for “Ochi” and “Nato” followed the moment the hand completed each 
action and was not touching the item. Therefore, in the case of the blue pipe handle, 
the hand moved to the handle, grabbed it and performed a pulling action. Then, the 
hand released the handle and paused next to the handle in which moment the 
intonation followed. After the intonation was heard, the hand moved to the red 
handle, grabbed it and performed another pulling action, released it and paused next 
to it, at which point the intonation was heard. The end result followed a second after 
the hand disappeared from the scene after the second action.
3.2.4 Design
The design of this experiment was identical to the one in the previous studies. 
Two actions, an accidental action and an intentional action, were modelled on each 
toy. Accidental actions were immediately followed by the word “Ochi” and 
intentional actions were followed by the word “Nato” both in the appropriate 
intonation. In the current study, each infant participated in these 2 conditions twice 
(two A-I toys and two I-A toys) which were counterbalanced as to the order the toy 
was presented. The actions related with each toy were also counterbalanced, so that
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the action of pulling a handle came first for half of the children while it came second 
for the other half of the sample. The indication of the accidental and intentional 
action (i.e. Nato or Ochi) was also counterbalanced so that half of the infants who had 
the handle being pulled first heard it being expressed accidentally while the other half 
heard it being expressed intentionally. Therefore, four video clips were created for 
each toy. This was done in order to have complete counterbalancing for the order of 
actions and intonations. Therefore, for two video clips, the order of the actions was 
the same but the intonations were reversed. For the other two video clips, the order of 
the actions was reversed and so were the intonations. The videoclips were presented 
in alternating order so that if children saw the first toy presented in the A-I condition, 
then they saw the third toy in the A-I condition and the second and fourth toy in the I- 
A condition. The same alternating pattern was followed when the first toy was 
presented in the I-A condition.
3.2.5 Procedure
Infants in this study first took part in a pilot study in another room prior to 
taking part in this study. The infants had a break for around 20 minutes where they 
played with toys in another room. During the study, infants sat on their parents’ knee 
and watched the video clips on a 17 inch computer screen which was placed on the 
left hand side of a table. The toys were kept under that table and were taken out in 
turn after both response periods had ended for the previous toy. During the warm-up 
toy, there were no intonation cues, just one action and the end result. Children who 
did not produce the end result were shown how to produce it. For the experimental 
session, although 5 experimental toys were constructed, four were presented for each 
child in this study, as one of them had already been used in the pilot study the children
54
had initially taken part in. There were two cameras focusing on the infant, the 
experimenter and the toys. The experimenter sat on the side of the table near the 
child. After the children had watched the video, they were presented with the toy they 
had just seen and just like in the first study they were asked to make it work. The toy 
was brought up from under the table and the children were given the toy for a 
response. After their response, the toy was taken down from the table and placed on 
the floor and was brought up on the table after the second demonstration with the 
same toy was completed. The procedure followed by the experimenter during the 
reproduction phase was similar to the previous studies. During the infant’s response 
the end result was activated only if the infant had reproduced the intentional action, 
but regardless of whether the infant had also reproduced an accidental action. When 
children were producing the actions, the end result followed about 2 seconds after an 
intentional reproduction because we wanted to allow the children to produce the 
accidental actions if they wanted to. Also, if the children were producing the 
accidental action and were focusing on it for about 5-7 seconds without reaching to 
produce the intentional action, or when they produced it and looked up for the end 
result, then the toy was taken away or was placed on the floor in order for the video to 
be presented again.
3.2.6 Scoring
The scoring was again identical to the first study. Infants’ responses were 
scored following the session from the video recording. For each trial the infants were 
scored for reproducing the First Action Only, the Second Action Only, Both Actions 
in Order, Both Actions in Incorrect Order, and Neither action.
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3.2.7 Reliability
A second coder naive to the purpose of the study watched the infant actions without 
sound and scored them according to whether the child produced one action or two 
actions. The results of the reliability showed that there was disagreement on only one 
trial for one child. A coefficient kappa score was calculated on the relationship 
between the experimenter’s ratings and the second coder’s ratings. The results 
showed a strong relationship k = .94.
3.2.8 Learning
In order to eliminate the possibility that infants in this study were learning how to do 
the task from exposure in subsequent trials, we plotted the data of each trial on a 
graph. Two graphs were produced, one that included all toys and another for which 
the Rudolf toy was excluded (Figure 3.1 and 3.2).
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Figure 3.1 Mean o f correct actions produced in the trials for all toys
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3.4 Results
The first descriptive statistics analysis was carried out on all the data 
combined, regardless of the condition they were in. In addition, these percentages 
also included actions that were enacted in order and incorrect order. This analysis 
showed that the total percentage of intentional actions (M = 79.11; SD = 13.65) was 
greater than the percentage of accidental actions (M = 52.68; SD = 24.39). A 
Wilcoxon test was carried out on these percentages and revealed that infants were 
producing significantly more intentional actions than they were producing accidental 
actions z = -3.19, p  < .001. When taking into account the times when children 
produced a single action for accidental and intentional and two actions for the order 
and incorrect order categories, the results were as following. The percentage of 
intentional actions (M = 47.95; SD = 23.24) was greater than the percentage of 
accidental actions (M = 20.27; SD = 14.32), z = -3.26, p < .001 and also greater than 
actions performed in order (M = 13.21; SD = 14.15), z = -2.74,p  < .01 and actions 
performed in the incorrect order (M = 18.31; SD = 19.41), z = -3.37,p  < .001.
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Separate analyses for each condition were also carried out. For the A-I 
condition, the percentage for the intentional actions (M = 41.25; SD = 33.34) was 
greater than that of accidental actions (M  = 15.40; SD = 22.33), z = -2.73, p  < .01 and 
greater than actions performed in order (M = 19.60; SD = 22.86), z = -2.50,/? < .01 
and incorrect order (M = 12.50; SD = 25.00), z = -2.69, p  < .01. Similar results were 
observed in the percentages of the I-A condition. However, the Wilcoxon test did not 
produce significant results in all the categories. The percentage of intentional actions 
(M = 41.25; SD = 31.70) was not significantly greater than that of accidental actions 
(M = 26.65; SD = 25.01), z = -1.45,/? < .15 and that of actions in incorrect order (.M 
= 25.00; SD = 26.24), z = -1.50,/? < .13. It was though significant in the difference 
between actions performed in order (M = 7.10; SD = 16.79), z = -2.91,/? < .01.
When the data were examined more closely, it was observed that a particular 
toy, Rudolf was problematic. Most infants who had seen and received this toy in the 
experiment chose to perform only one action on it, the action of pulling and not the 
action of lifting. We speculated that infants must have not encoded the lifting action 
from the video for various reasons; one of them being that perhaps it was not as 
salient on the video as the pulling action. We wanted to examine whether this kind of 
behaviour by the children had affected the results. Therefore, we carried out analyses 
on the result in which we excluded this problematic toy. These analyses were carried 
out by converting the raw data into percentages depending on how many toy 
demonstrations (excluding the one with Rudolf) children had seen.
The overall results, when collapsing the conditions, showed that infants 
produced significantly more intentional actions than other categories, in all 
conditions, except in the IA condition where the difference between intentional only
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actions and actions produced in the incorrect order was not significant. The results 
can be seen on Table 3.1 and 3.2.
Table 3.1. Mean, Standard Deviation and significance values for A - I  condition 
after Rudolf toy was eliminated from the analyses
Condition A - I
M SD z p
Intentional 53.75 36.52
Accidental 14.15 22.46 -2.77 .01
Order 23.35 29.10 -2.03 .04
Incorrect Order 11.25 24.97 -2.51 .01
Table 3.2. Mean, Standard Deviation and significance values for I  -A condition after 
Rudolf toy was eliminated from the analyses
Condition I - A
M SD z V
Intentional 41.25 36.52
Accidental 15.00 20.52 -2.38 .02
Order 10.85 21.01 -2.25 .03
Incorrect Order 32.50 33.54 • 00 .43
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3.3.1 Vocal Analyses
Vocal analyses using the acoustical analysis software program Praat, were 
conducted on the two intonations used in the study. The mean Fo for the purposeful 
intonation was 374.12 Hz, which was slightly higher than the F0oi the accidental 
intonation of 337.08 Hz. The accidental intonation ranged between 393.58 and 
281.82 Hz and the intentional between 487.49 and 212.16 Hz. Ideally we would be 
interested in comparing the pitch ratings for different parts of the two utterances in 
order to see whether they differed significantly from each other. However, in the 
accidental intonation there is a 35 millisecond undefined period due to the intonation 
being pronounced in exaggerated infant-directed speech. Because of this, Praat was 
not able to define the pitch for that “gap”. Katz, Cohen and Moore demonstrated that 
the pitch contour can give an indication to the pragmatic category of utterances 
(1996). The purposeful intonation in our study has a contour of rise and then a flat 
contour which makes it sound as a positive and unequivocal quality. The accidental 
intonation has a flat contour with a short “gap” which has a quality of sounding 
unexpected. Graphs of the pitch and intensity contours for the accidental and 
intentional intonations can be seen on Figure 3.3 and 3.4.
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Figure 3.3. Pitch and Intensity Contours For Accidental Intonation
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Figure 3.4. Pitch and Intensity Contours for Intentional Intonation
600
450
£  300
150
o
o
Time (ms)
E 30
I—  CO CO co o>
m  in co to O) to O) Ifl.co q  o> 
o  o  o
CM N - CO OO CO O )
T— CM CM CO CO T J- ■*}-
T -  CO o  o CTJ LO t o  COto
Time (sec)
3.5 Discussion
The results of this study showed that infants between 16 and 18 months are 
able to infer the intentions of others through the tone of voice. These findings 
replicate the findings of our previous study (Chapter 2) where the older children in 
our sample were able to infer other’s intentions. This study’s findings are also
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important because they show that infants are as able in this prerecorded video 
demonstration as they are in the live demonstrations of the previous set of studies. 
Next, we wanted to look at intention understanding though intonation more 
specifically in 14 month old children. Our previous studies had infants of 14 months 
in them but in this following study we wanted to examine a group of 14-month-olds 
more carefully. In order to assess this, we carried out the same experiment as the one 
reported above with the 16- to 18-month-olds with a group of 14 month old infants.
Study 2: Fourteen-Month-Olds
3.6 Method
3.6.1 Participants
The participants in this study were twenty 14-month-olds. Overall, 29 
participants were tested in this study but 3 were excluded due to experimenter error, 4 
due to the baby being agitated and not completing the study and 2 due to toy 
malfunction. The 20 participants in the final sample ranged in age from 13 months,
11 days to 14 months, 24 days. The mean age was 14 months, 5 days.
3.6.2 Design, Materials and Procedure
The toys for this study were similar to the toys for the study with the 17- 
month-olds. Due to the problem with the Rudolf toy, we started off with the other 
four toys, Puppet, Chicken, Pirate and Elf. Halfway through the study, because we 
wanted to use the Puppet toy for another study (the looking time study described in 
Chapter 6) we ended up changing the Rudolf toy to make the two action parts of it 
equally salient. We made the two action parts equally salient by placing a handle on
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the box which we also painted black to have it match the black circular handle already 
on the toy. The rest of the toys were the same and the procedure was the same as in 
the abovementioned study.
3.6.3 Reliability
A second coder naive to the purpose of the study watched the infant actions 
without sound and scored them according to whether the child produced one action or 
two actions. The results of the reliability showed that there was disagreement on only 
one trial for two children. A coefficient kappa score was calculated on the 
relationship between the experimenter’s ratings and the second coder’s ratings. The 
results showed a strong relationship k = .90.
3.7 Results
The first analysis was carried out on the total number of intentional and 
accidental actions performed by the infants. This analysis took into account instances 
where infants had performed both actions in order and both actions in incorrect order. 
The results of this analysis showed that overall infants produced more intentional 
actions (M = 71.25; SD = 15.76) than accidental actions (M = 55.63; SD = 23.46), z = 
-2.00, p  > .046. The next analysis took into account the overall intentional only 
actions and compared them with accidental only actions and actions done in order and 
incorrect order for both the A-I and I-A condition. The results showed no significant 
differences in the comparison between intentional (M = 41.07; SD = 24.38) and 
accidental actions (M = 27.94; SD = 15.18), z = -1.69,p  > .09. However, there were 
significant results between intentional actions and actions done in order (M  = 17.56; 
SD = 16.89), z = -2.46,/? > .01 and actions done in the incorrect order (M -  13.39;
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SD = 16.42), z = -2.73, p  > .01. Follow up analyses were carried out on the two 
conditions A-I and I-A separately. These results showed some significant differences 
in the A-I and I-A condition. These results can be seen on Table 3.3 and 3.4.
Table 3.3. Mean, Standard Deviation and significance values for A - 1 condition
Condition A - I
M SD z p
Intentional 45.42 33.82
Accidental 24.17 27.56 -1.55 .12
Order 17.50 24.46 -2.39 .01
Incorrect Order 12.92 25.29 -2.41 .02
Table 3.4. Mean, Standard Deviation and significance values for I - A  condition
Condition I - A
M SD z p
Intentional 37.50 33.93
Accidental 31.25 25.49 -.38 .71
Order 17.50 23.08 -1.67 .10
Incorrect Order 13.75 18.98 -.1.98 .05
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3.8 Discussion
The overall results of the 14-month-olds showed that infants at this age have 
some understanding about the intentions of others as they copied more intentional 
actions than accidental actions when all actions were calculated together. However, 
their results were not as strong as those of the 17-month-olds who performed more 
intentional only actions than the 14-month-olds. These results suggest that intention 
understanding as shown by this task develops between 14 and 18 months of age.
3.9 General Discussion
The findings of these two studies are consistent with our findings of the 
previous study on intention understanding in the tone of voice. The results showed 
weaker results for the 14-month-olds than the 17-month-olds. One conclusion that we 
can draw from these results, and from previous findings is that intonation alone is a 
good source of information for young prelinguistic children as it gives them not only 
information about emotions, but additional information about mental states such as 
people’s intentions. One can say that the information given out by intonation is vital 
as it allows young children to gain further insights to the minds of other people 
without words to guide them to that understanding. This notion is not surprising 
when we take into account the studies that have shown that infants are sensitive to the 
tone of voice from moments after birth (DeCasper & Fifer, 1980; Hepper et al., 1993).
In addition, the results of these studies call further attention to the type of 
intonation that infants find salient. It seems from previous studies that infants from 
the beginning of their lives are sensitive to emotional prosody. This attention to 
prosody has been well documented in studies with young infants (Femald, 1985;
1993; Trainor et al., 2000) and could be a confounding effect that further studies need
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to address. However, we believe that other acoustic characteristics such as the shorter 
duration of the accidental intonation might have given cues as to the abruptness 
associated with an accidental message and thus to the accidental mental state.
In our two studies we propose that infants are making inferences about mental 
states. In order to perform well on this task, infants have to make an inference about 
the experimenter’s behaviour, that is, the experimenter’s actions (in this case only 
intonation as the actions are neutral) towards the goal which is to make the toy work. 
Although we are unable to say with certainty, there is a possibility that infants in this 
study could be making their responses based on the pitch level of the vocal cues and 
the pitch contour. In addition, infants could be making their judgements on the basis 
of valence. The next study examines this possibility of emotional valence guiding 
infants’ behaviour.
The results of this study confirm our previous findings and also show that 
infants can still succeed on the task despite the fact that the visual and audio stimuli 
are pre-recorded and not live demonstrations. However, the fact that one of the toys, 
Rudolf, proved problematic might be related to infants’ inability to process all aspects 
of the video. This predicament might have been a result of saliency. This particular 
toy had a ring tied to a string which could be pulled and a less distinct box lid that 
could be lifted. Therefore, it is possible that the video presentation made one action 
more salient than the other and thus offered different affordances for the infants. 
Future studies using video demonstrations must make sure that they make stimuli very 
salient to infants. When such precautions have been taken, this pre-recorded format is 
a functional and practical arrangement that allows for the control of audio and video 
stimuli.
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The data produced in these studies open up a question that requires further 
examination. This is a question about what role valence plays in the studies 
conducted this far. Is it possible that infants are succeeding in these studies as a result 
of the positive and negative valence that might be incorporated in these stimuli? One 
possibility is that infants might be successful because they associate the intentional 
intonation with something that sounds positive and the accidental intonation with 
something that sounds less positive, or negative. This is an important distinction that 
needs to be taken into account because in return it might affect infants’ judgements 
about valence and not about mental states. Because this video-recorded paradigm has 
allowed us to run pilot studies and find representative intonations, a similar study can 
be carried out using this paradigm that will allow us to tease apart this issue of 
valence versus mental states. One such study could utilise purposeful and accidental 
intonations that are similar in pitch, and other vocal characteristics, such as intensity 
(loudness), duration, as well as the implied positivity or negativity of the sound. The 
next study should control these acoustical features so that they are kept constant but 
should discriminate between the mental states so they communicate two different 
mental states. Only in a highly controlled experiment will we be able to get to the 
foundation of mental state understanding and the new pre-recorded procedure will 
allow that.
Previous studies so far have shown that infants are aware of prosody, which 
plays an important role in the first year of life as it gives infants indications for 
people’s emotions (Trainor et al, 2000). However, as infants gain more experience of 
people and the world around them, they could be expanding their knowledge of 
emotional prosody by constructing knowledge about mental states, and how these can 
be expressed in the tone of voice.
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The studies conducted thus far on infants’ understanding of intentions from 
intonation bring us a step closer to answering questions regarding infants’ ability to 
make inferences about people’s mental states. The intonations used in the second 
study have been selected as purposeful and accidental. Although one could state that 
the results for these studies give us enough reason to believe that infants can make 
inferences about mental states, this assumption should be further explored in 
conditions where acoustical characteristics are taken into account. The next study 
looks at this distinction between valence and mental states.
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CHAPTER 4: INFERRING INTENTIONS FROM INTONATION:
THE ROLE OF VALENCE
4.1 Introduction
In our previous studies we examined whether infants can infer the mental 
states of another person through the intonation expressed in her voice. In these 
studies infants saw an adult in both live and pre-recorded videos produce actions that 
were followed by accidental and intentional intonations. The results indicate that at 
around 16 months infants are able to infer the intentions of others from the tone of 
voice alone. The intonations in the previous studies incorporated various acoustical 
features such as pitch contours, mean pitch, amplitude and duration of the utterances. 
One possible confound in these studies is the additional feature of emotional or 
prosodic valence carried in the intonation when expressing these words. It is 
therefore possible that the emotional valence associated with the mental state gave 
infants cues as to intentionality but not necessarily to the mental states of the person 
expressing the intonation. Therefore, infants in these studies could have 
discriminated between the two emotions, the positive one associated with the 
intentional intonation and the less positive one associated with the accidental 
intonation and based their actions on just the cues given by the valance.
Research has documented infants’ ability to discriminate emotions in both the 
face and voice modalities. More specifically, infants as young as five months are able 
to discriminate different emotions from the voice such as happiness, sadness and 
anger when these are presented in conjunction to a facial expression (D’Entremont & 
Muir, 1999; Walker-Andrews & Grolnick, 1983; Walker-Andrews & Lennon, 1991). 
Some other studies have found that five month old infants are capable of
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discriminating vocal expressions of positive and negative emotions but cannot do the 
same when they are presented with the equivalent facial expressions (Femald, 1992). 
Similarly Moore and colleagues (Moore, Spence & Katz, 1997; Spence & Moore, 
2003) found similar results for 6-month-olds, who were able to discriminate emotions 
of approval and comforting in vocal expressions which differed from 4-month-olds 
who could only perform the discrimination when they were aided by a facial 
expression. On the contrary other studies support that infants are able to recognise 
and distinguish anger, fear and surprise in the facial expressions of female adults 
(Serrano, Iglesias & Loeches, 1992).
The question of interest in our research, and the one we tried to resolve in this 
study, is whether infants can discriminate and respond by selecting the appropriate 
mental state from two similarly positive sounding intonations. A study that 
investigated infants’ ability to discriminate and differentiate between different degrees 
of positive emotion was conducted by Bomstein and Arterberry (2003). In a series of 
experiments in this study, infants were habituated to pictures that displayed four 
degrees of smile. Then they were presented with an expression of an intermediate 
degree of smile and an expression of fear, both presented by the same person. The 
five month old infants in this study looked longer at the expression of fear over the 
new expression of smile which indicates that they recognised the new degree of smile 
but thought the fear expression differed from the smiling expression they had seen 
before. This study also demonstrated that infants can not only discriminate among 
facial expression but they can also categorise facial expressions. This ability to 
categorise was shown when 5-month-olds were habituated to four degrees of emotion 
each presented by a different person and then tested on an average smile displayed by 
a new person and a fearful expression also presented by a new person. The results
71
showed that despite the fact that the expressions were portrayed by different people, 
infants appeared to be able to categorise the smiling expression with the ones they had 
seen during habituation because they still looked longer at the expression of fear.
This study’s findings support that infants are sensitive to facial expressions of 
emotion at an early age and they are able not only to recognise and discriminate 
emotion, but they are also able to categorise it and group it with similar emotions they 
had previously seen (Bomstein & Arterberry, 2003).
Although studies like the one by Bomstein and Arterberry (2003) have found 
intriguing results for sophisticated abilities in young infants, this type of abilities have 
not received as much attention by researchers studying similar abilities in the vocal 
domain. Furthermore, studies on the ability to infer mental states from the tone of 
voice are almost nonexistent. With this study, we wanted to examine whether infants 
at around 18 months of age are able to infer the mental states of another person when 
the person utters vocal intonation that indicates two different mental states. In our 
previous studies infants were able to understand and distinguish the two mental states 
but we wanted to make sure that they were not discriminating on the basis of 
emotional valence. In these previous studies, it is possible that infants were copying 
more intentional actions because the intonation following those intentional actions 
sounded more positive than the accidental intonation that was indicating the 
accidental actions.
From research on the ability to produce intonation we know that young infants 
are quite advanced at producing vocal expressions (Balog & Snow, 2007). Research 
on intonation has found that infants are attracted to positive intonation. Infants also 
prefer listening to infant directed speech over adult directed speech. A study that 
compared utterances spoken in positive adult directed and typical infant directed
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speech found that infants were more attracted to the adult directed speech which was 
as a result of the positive affect in the intonation (Singh, Morgan & Best, 2002).
Balog and Snow (2007) further suggested that there is a U shaped trend in the 
production of intonation by infants and young children. They propose that there is 
more advance production between the ages of-6 and 8 months, which drops between 9 
and 14 months and is elevated back to a higher level of production at around 18 to 20 
months. These authors further suggest that this falling off in production behaviour 
might be the result of the developmental changes that infants go through around the 
ages of 9 months, including the onset of communicative intentions, walking, and the 
emergence of the first words. Balog and Snow suggest that at 18 months, when 
infants return to their old levels of intonation production might be the result of 
stability in their system (Balog & Snow, 2007).
Research that has looked at intonation and in particular the effect of pitch 
contours on adults’ ability to detect various emotions has had inconclusive results as 
to whether it is the contour or other characteristics of the acoustics of intonation that 
lead to the discrimination of different emotions. Some researchers, however, have 
suggested that characteristics such as the pitch range, global F0 level and voice 
quality might have a greater effect on emotion recognition than the shape of the 
contour (Ladd, Silverman, Tolkmitt, Bergmann & Scherer, 1985; Scherer, Feldstein, 
Bond & Rosenthal, 1985; as cited in Banziger & Scherer, 2005). More specifically, 
Scherer and colleagues have suggested that “vocal aspects covarying with emotional 
attributions (such as F0 level in this study) might mainly reflect and communicate 
physiological arousal associated to the emotional reaction, whereas configurations of 
prosodic features (such as F0 contour shapes) would be used to signal specific
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attitudes in association with the linguistic content of the utterance” (Scherer, Ladd & 
Silverman, 1984; as cited in Banziger & Scherer, 2005, p.256).
One acoustic characteristic of intonation, the pitch contour, has received 
attention from researchers interested in intonation. Pitch contours have been 
described in terms of the expression of attitudes. In particular, contours of the type 
rise-fall (which is the contour that describes this study’s intentional intonation) has 
been described as involving “a sense of finality, completeness, definiteness” 
(Cruttenden, 1997, p. 92). In addition the low and rising contour has been described as 
conveying incredulity, as well as an expression that indicates that something might be 
incorrect (Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg, 1992). At the same time, rising contours have 
been described as conveying the meaning of “non-finality” (Cruttenden, 1997, p. 92), 
which in turn might signify incongruity, or that something is questionable.
In our opinion, mental states are providing meaning in the way that pitch 
contours are providing information about attitudes. We also believe that mental states 
are related to emotions in the same way that acoustical characteristics of intonation 
are affecting emotion attributions from the tone of voice. However, we believe 
mental states to also differ from emotions. We consider the process of mental state 
understanding to be based on attributions or inferences about unobservable behaviours 
that can occur in conjunction with observable behaviours. Mental states can therefore 
be inferences about another person’s intentions, desires, and goals among others. 
Emotions are related to intentions, desires, and goals as they are often the resulting 
expressions of a successful or unsuccessful plan of action or the result of attaining or 
failing to meet a goal. Emotions are also observable such as in the expressions in the 
face and the voice and therefore they might not require the high level processing that 
a mental state might need. In addition, mental states might differ from emotions, as
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mental states are attributions as to what caused that emotion in the first place. 
Therefore, although valence in emotional expressions might often be enough to help 
someone understand whether the person is experiencing a positive or negative 
emotion, some additional step is needed in order to reason why this emotion is linked 
with this experience. We can therefore conclude that mental state understanding is 
needed in order to appraise what caused that emotion in the first place and that 
understanding a mental state is often what helps give meaning to the emotion one is 
feeling.
In this study, we wanted to see whether infants are able to understand the 
intentions of another person when the two intonations expressing the different 
intentions are similar in affective valence but do differ in other acoustical 
characteristics. In order to achieve this we wanted to include intonations that 
maintained a similar FO level and FO range in order to control for emotional 
information. At the same time we wanted to manipulate the FO contour shape in order 
to manipulate the attitude and mental state conveyed by the speaker. The 
characteristics that we believe would make an intentional intonation differ from an 
accidental or nonpurposeful intonation include the pitch contour and to some extent 
the duration of the utterance.
Study 1: Pilot With Adults
4.2 Method
A pilot study was run in order to obtain the audio stimuli that were to be used 
in the main study. A female adult produced these utterances and was a native Greek 
speaker. The adult aimed at producing intonations that had a rise-fall FO contour for 
intentional intonations and a rising FO contour for the accidental intonations. At the
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same time the adult tried to produce intonations that ranged from neutral to positive. 
Fifty utterances were chosen for the pilot study. Five of these 50 utterances were used 
as practice trials for the first part of the pilot study, which was to rate the utterances as 
to whether they sounded positive or negative. Another 5 of these utterances were 
used as practice trials in the second part which was to rate the utterances as to whether 
they sounded accidental or intentional. Twenty adult participants heard the remaining 
40 utterances in each part. Twenty of the utterances were of the word Nato, half of 
which were expressed with different types of intentional intonation and half were 
expressed with different types of accidental intonation. The other twenty utterances 
were of the word Ochi half of which were expressed with different types of 
intentional intonation and half with accidental intonation. In the first part of the study 
the participants were asked to rate whether the intonation sounded positive or 
negative. After their positive or negative decision they were also asked to rate their 
decision on a scale from 1 to 5. If they had chosen positive for example, they had to 
choose how positive it sounded, with 1 being just a little bit positive and 5 being very 
positive. For the second part they were instructed to rate intonations as to whether 
they sounded accidental or intentional. They were further instructed to think of an 
intentional intonation as in the case when the person did an action purposefully and 
achieved it, and for the accidental intonation as in the case when the person did an 
action which she did not mean to do. After each decision, participants had to rate the 
utterance as to how accidental or intentional it sounded on a scale from 1 to 5. The 
results of the pilot study determined two Nato intonations that sounded equally 
positive and had the following characteristics. Intentional Nato: Mean Pitch = 336 
Hz, Range = 474 to 234 Hz, Intensity = 74 db. Accidental Nato: Mean Pitch = 426 
Hz, Range = 842 to 245 Hz, Intensity = 74.55 db. The rating that these intonations
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received on the positive valence scale was 2.5 out of 5 (middle). These two chosen 
intonations were used throughout the study.
Study 2: Study With Infants
4.3 Method
4.3.1 Participants
Nineteen infants took part in this study. The infants’ ages ranged from 17 
months 12 days and 18 months 17 days. The mean age was 18 months, 2 days. 
Overall, 22 infants took part in the study but 3 infants were excluded. Two were 
excluded due to experimenter error and 1 because the infant did not finish the study.
4.3.2 Materials and Design
The materials and design for this study were the same as in the two previous 
chapters. Four toys were again used for the test phase of this study. Because in 
chapter 3 we saw that one of the toys, Rudolf was problematic, we decided to exclude 
it for this study. Instead, we used the other 4 toys, Puppet, Elf, Chicken and Pirate.
4.3.3 Procedure
The procedure for this study was the same as that described in chapter 3. 
Infants watched videos of an adult’s hand performing actions on toys. After each 
action an intonation that was either intentional or accidental was uttered. Following 
the second action and the second intonation a fun outcome, the end result, appeared. 
After each video was completed, the experimenter put the actual toy on the table and 
asked the child, “Can you make it work?” Infants produced actions and the session
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was videotaped in order to score the actions for each toy later. Each child received 
the training toy and 4 other toys per session.
4.3.4 Scoring
The scoring was the same as in the previous chapters. The infants’ responses 
were scored from the video recordings. The actions were scored as being Intentional, 
Accidental in Order and Incorrect order as well as Neither action.
4.3.5 Reliability
A second coder naive to the purpose of the study watched the infant actions 
without sound and scored them according to whether the child produced one action or 
two actions. The results of the reliability showed that there was disagreement on only 
one trial for two children. A coefficient kappa value was calculated on the 
relationship between the experimenter’s scoring and the second coder’s scoring. The 
results showed a strong relationship k = .92.
4.5 Results
The first analysis took into account the overall number of intentional actions 
and accidental actions by also combining actions that were done in order and incorrect 
order to the accidental only and intentional only actions. The results of the 
comparison between overall accidental and intentional actions showed no significant 
effect. The mean overall intentional actions performed by the children were 72.09 
(SD = 14.12) and the mean accidental were 69.26 (SD = 13.99), z = -.55,/? = .59.
The next analysis looked at the comparison between the intentional only actions and 
accidental only actions and the other categories of actions done in order and incorrect
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order. This comparison showed nonsignificant results for the comparison between 
intentional actions only (M = 29.38; SD = 14.60) and accidental actions only (M = 
28.07; SD = 13.53), z = -.16,/? = .88. The comparison between intentional actions 
only and actions done in order was also nonsignificant, (M  = 24.78; SD = 12.99), z = - 
.81,/? = .42. However the comparison between the intentional actions only and 
actions done in the incorrect order was significant (M = 17.11; SD = 10.20), z = -2.51,
p  < .01.
Another analysis looked at the two conditions separately. There were 
significant results in the comparisons between intentional actions only and actions 
done in the incorrect order in the Accidental-Intentional condition. The other 
significant results were between the Intentional only actions and actions performed in 
order in the Intentional-Accidental condition. The results can be seen in detail on 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
Table 4.1. Mean, Standard Deviation and significance values for A - I  condition
Condition A - I
M SD z P
Intentional 26.31 30.59
Accidental 28.07 21.91 -.35 .73
Order 36.41 24.88 -.99 .32
Incorrect Order 7.89 11.94 -2.17 .03
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Table 4.2. Mean, Standard Deviation and significance values fo r  I - A  condition
Condition I - A
M_______ SD z p
Intentional 32.45 18.19
Accidental 28.07 23.44 -.70 .48
Order 13.16 15.29 -3.99 .003
Incorrect Order 26.32 20.28 -.71 .48
4.5.1 Vocal Analyses
Vocal analyses using the acoustical analysis software Praat were conducted on 
the two intonations used in this study. The mean Fo for the intentional intonation was 
336.15 Hz. The mean Fo for the accidental intonation was higher with 426.74 Hz. 
Other characteristics for the accidental intonation included a range of 612.01 Hz and a 
duration of 1.12 seconds. The intentional intonation had a range of 242.69 Hz and a 
duration of 0.77 seconds. The amplitude for the intentional intonation was 73.98 db 
and for the accidental was 74.55 db. The intonation contour for the intentional 
intonation was a rise-fall contour and the accidental contour was a rising contour.
The two contours can be seen in Figure 4.1 and 4.2.
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Figure 4.1. Intentional Intonation Contour
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Figure 4.2. Accidental Intonation Contour
4.6 Discussion
The results of the current study showed that children have difficulties in this 
task. The results showed that infants on average produced similar amounts of 
intentional actions and accidental actions. Therefore, these results showed that the
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percentage of correct intentional actions is a lot lower than that observed in our 
previous studies. The difficulties that infants had with this task can be attributed to 
different potential factors. One possible factor is that infants cannot distinguish 
between two intonations that are similarly positive. It is possible that infants cannot 
hear the difference between the two mental states, that is, they hear them as similar 
due to the resemblance in valence. However, our hypothesis that the intonation 
contour should be able to inform infants about another person’s mental state makes us 
sceptical about such a conclusion. In addition, the study as it stands right now has 
some confounds that are likely to have given rise to the above results. The first 
confound are the words chosen for this study. During the pilot study, we presented 
adults with the word Ochi and the word Nato pronounced with both accidental and 
intentional intonations. Some of these intonations received a very positive rating, 
some received a rating of around 5 (max positive rating) and some received a rating of 
less than 5. We decided to choose intonations that were rated as close to a rating of 5, 
however, the two representative intonations for this rating were of the word Nato. 
Therefore, we ended up using these 2 intonations which were expressed with the same 
word. Having these intonations expressed through these two words might be a 
hindrance for this study as children at this age are word learners. Studies like the 
Friend study (2001) have shown that around 16 months, when infants begin to build 
their vocabulary, they tend to focus more on the words of a message rather than the 
intonation in which the message is expressed in. Therefore, due to the fact that the 
infants in this study were 18-month-olds it is possible that a lot of the infants in the 
sample focused more on the words than on the intonation. This is one of the reasons 
that could explain why we see a lot fewer intentional actions in this study and why we 
see more accidental actions and actions done in order and incorrect order than in
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previous studies. This confound could be resolved by including two different words 
instead of one.
From the results of this study we are therefore unable to conclude whether the 
intonation contours have or do not have an effect when it comes to interpreting mental 
states, such as intentions. Further research is needed to provide answers to the 
question of mental states through the tone of voice. A possible avenue for research is 
through adult participants. This question of intonation contours and other acoustical 
characteristics has not been widely and consistently studied and research is lacking 
especially for the mental state of intention. Further research could examine the role 
that valence plays when we are inferring mental states. It is important to carry out 
work that takes valence into consideration and which tries to shed light to the function 
and relationship of valence to mental states. For this reason, it might be easier to test 
hypotheses with adult participants to understand the role of valence and then apply 
this to work with infants and young children.
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CHAPTER 5: INFERRING INTENTIONS FROM INTONATION: 
EVIDENCE FROM LOOKING TIMES
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will consider a new method for assessing intention 
understanding, the looking time paradigm. Our first aim for using this method is to 
replicate the findings that we have found with the imitation paradigm in the previous 
chapters. A second aim for using this paradigm is to assess intention understanding in 
our 14-month-old sample that was not performing as well as the older infants.
Looking time paradigms have demonstrated that they can yield results with younger 
infants because all that is required from these infants is to look at the stimuli without 
having to exhibit any other form of behaviour. In the following paragraphs I will 
discuss research that utilised this paradigm and reveal what types of questions have 
been answered as a result of using this paradigm.
As the paradigm’s name suggests, this methodology depends on infant 
attention as a measure which is elicited by the infant’s looking behaviour following 
different events. This paradigm has been used to study infants’ understanding of 
perception, cognition and social cognition. In addition to the different areas of 
research, it has been utilised to examine different mechanisms and processes, such as 
categorisation and discrimination (Bomstein & Arterberry, 2003). One area that has 
received a lot of attention from researchers using looking time paradigms is goal 
attribution. Looking time paradigms have been widely used in the study of this 
particular area because goals are linked to actions, and actions can be easily executed 
with hand movements, head turns, and pointing. Because infants have the ability to
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observe and process such actions, this reasonably easily set up method has been 
utilised widely to study these aspects of social cognition.
The looking time paradigm and its variants have been used for decades to 
study both perceptual and cognitive aspects of behaviour. Some of the modifications 
of the looking time paradigm include the “habituation paradigm” and the “violation of 
expectancy paradigm.” The habituation paradigm rests on the assumption that infants 
become used to (and thus habituate) looking at a scene that is repeated. This 
repeating scene familiarises the infants with the relations of two or more aspects of 
the scene. Habituation is determined by calculating the criterion at which infants look 
at the scene for approximately half of the time that was spent looking at the scene the 
first 3 times it was presented. Following habituation, they are presented with two test 
events which differ slightly from the initial habituation event. One of the test events is 
similar with what infants were looking at during habituation, whereas the other scene 
differs in relation to the initial habituation scene. The dependent variable of interest is 
the amount of time infants look at one of the test events versus the other.
In order to illustrate how this technique works, I will focus on some studies by 
one of the biggest exponents of the habituation technique, Amanda Woodward. 
Woodward and her colleagues have demonstrated on various occasions that infants 
are sensitive to the hand actions of others and the goals to which these actions are 
extended to. In one of her studies Woodward was interested in the effect that agency, 
either animate or inanimate, might play in the attribution of goals. For this study she 
compared infants’ looking time to events where a human arm was reaching and 
grasping objects versus looking time at scenes where a rod or a claw were grasping 
these objects. In one such study, 5-, 6- and 9-month-olds were habituated to the arm 
of a person that reached and grasped one of two toys that were placed next to each
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other (Woodward, 1998). Following habituation, during the two test events the 
position of the toys was changed, so that infants saw either the person reaching and 
grasping the same toy as before (now in the other toy’s position), or reaching and 
grasping the other toy which was now in the same position as the toy that was grasped 
during habituation. So the person now either reached towards the same position as 
during habituation, but grasped a different toy (new goal/old path) or grasped the 
same toy as habituation but from a different position (old goal/new path). In the 
inanimate conditions, the same procedure was carried out but this time the arm was 
replaced by a rod, (or a claw in another condition). The results indicate that in the 
arm condition, infants looked longer at the object than at the path of movement. This 
was not seen in the inanimate conditions. More specifically, the 6- and 9-month-olds 
(and the 5-month-olds to some extent) in the hand condition dishabituated, that is they 
regained interest to the new goal/old path test events. The infants in the inanimate 
conditions responded to the test events equally. Woodward concluded that infants in 
the hand condition selectively encoded the goal of the actor’s grasp and the infants in 
the inanimate condition did not. These findings suggest that infants can differentiate 
between human agency and inanimate agency and expect that human activity is goal 
directed. In a follow up study, these results were extended to grasping movements 
versus back of hand movements. The results again showed that 5- and 9-month-olds 
interpreted the grasping movements to be directed towards the toy, which they 
interpreted as the goal of the grasping action, whereas they did not show preference 
between the two test events in the back of hand condition (Woodward, 1999).
Other studies using this methodology have confirmed these findings. For 
example, Hofer, Hauf, and Aschersleben (2005) replicated Woodward’s (1998) claw 
condition and obtained similar results. However in a separate condition, when prior
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to the study they showed 9-month-olds that it was an actual person who was operating 
the claw behind the screen, and were also given the chance to play and examine the 
claw, they found that 9-month-old infants performed similarly to 12-month-olds.
They looked longer at the object change than the path change. These researchers 
concluded that infants were able to distinguish between the two events and attribute 
goal directedness after they had seen the claw being treated as a tool. Similarly, 
Guajardo and Woodward (2004) found that showing infants that a glove covered hand 
belonged to a person altered previous results where 7- and 12-month-olds had seen 
the gloved hand without an indication that it was worn by a person. They concluded 
that the interpretation that infants give to an entity and its relation to goal directed 
action relates to the extent to which that entity is viewed as human or not.
Other studies by Woodward and colleagues have generalised these findings to 
the relation between gazing and objects at 12 months and the relation between objects 
and gazing together with grasping movements at 7 and 9 months (Woodward, 2003). 
These results showed that infants consider gazing towards objects as an intentional 
and goal-directed action. Similar findings were shown in a study that examined the 
relation between pointing and objects, as 12-month-olds but not 9-month-olds looked 
longer towards the goal object rather than the path of motion. This finding suggests 
that 12-month-olds understand the relation between people’s pointing actions and the 
object they are attending and referring to (Woodward, Sommerville & Guajardo, 
2001). Taken together these findings on goal-directed behaviour through habituation 
reveal that even at 5 months, infants have expectations about goal directedness from 
human agents.
I am now turning to the other form of looking time paradigm, the violation-of- 
expectation paradigm. This paradigm presupposes that infants have expectations
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about events in the world and relies on the notion that infants are sensitive to the 
incongruent aspects of these events. Researchers who have used this paradigm 
consider that infants attend differentially to certain events, depending on the 
expectations they have about the role of these events, and therefore they look longer 
at events that violate their expectation. In the violation of expectation paradigm 
researchers usually familiarise rather than habituate infants before the test events.
This is because if infants already have a notion about the event then they do not need 
additional time to become familiar with it. Studies that use the violation-of- 
expectation paradigm have mostly focused on young infants’ understanding of 
physical properties in the world. In a review of studies using violation-of-expectation 
to examine infants’ understanding of occlusion, containment and covering,
Baillargeon (2004) showed that infants around the age of 2.5 and 3 months are able to 
detect violations in the relationship between objects and their locations, the property 
of objects to not allow other objects in them when they are closed, and that objects 
continue to exist even when they are covered. These findings seem to suggest that 
infants have some sense of physics early on in development.
In addition to using violation-of-expectation to study physical properties, some 
researchers have also used it to examine social aspects of behaviour. Phillips et al., 
(2002) examined the relation between facial expression and intentions. They argued 
that because an intentional and a non-intentional movement can appear behaviourally 
identical, it is other features such as movements and expressions which can help us in 
identifying intentions. They propose that intentional actions (which are described as 
acts that are directed towards target objects) and additional behavioural characteristics 
such as gaze, facial expression and vocalisations can give an indication as to whether 
an intention is positive or negative. Phillips et al. use the term “functional
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connections” to describe the connections between movements and facial and vocal 
expressions. They also suggest that the object-directedness of actions on objects and 
these functional connections that link actions and expressions can help identify 
intentions. In one of their studies with 14-month-old infants, they utilised gaze to 
examine whether infants can attribute intentionality to gaze when no grasping action 
was involved (Phillips et al, 2002). In this study, there were two toy cats placed on 
the left and right side of a table. The infants saw the adult only directing gaze to one 
of the two cats during the familiarisation trials (the experimenter looked at one of two 
cats but did not grab it during habituation). The experimenter looked at the cat with 
an expression of interest and joy and said “look at the kitty.” These familiarisation 
trials were infant controlled so if the infant looked away from the trial for more than 
two seconds, the trial ended. During the test events, the adult looked and emoted 
towards the other cat (Cat B, i.e. not the one they saw in habituation). Following the 
test events a curtain fell which then opened again to reveal the adult holding one of 
the cats. During the incongruent event the experimenter picked up cat A, and during 
the congruent event she picked up cat B. Infants were shown the consistent event 3 
times, and the inconsistent event 3 times. These were shown in alternation. Phillips et 
al. (2002) found that infants looked longer at the incongruent events than the 
congruent events.
An interesting aspect of the Phillips et al study is that even though these 
infants were only familiarized to the gaze and the emotion (visual-emotional regard) 
of the experimenter without subsequent action during habituation, they were still able 
to infer that this visual emotional regard would result in the experimenter picking up 
the cat that they were expressing interest towards. This suggests that the 14-month- 
olds demonstrate recognition of the connection between visual-emotional regard and
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subsequent actions and find it strange when the adult did not proceed to complete 
their intention to pick up the cat they were emotion towards. In addition, the 
researchers claim that since the familiarisation phase did not show the subsequent 
actions (only the visual-emotional regard), then the infants could not have learned this 
emotion-action connection in this procedure. Thus, the data provide strong support 
that infants at 14 months expect an adult to pick up something that the adult regards 
positively (Phillips et al., 2002).
This study by Phillips et al (2002) is one of the first to demonstrate that infants 
are sensitive to the mental states of others, such as their intentions. More recently, 
another study has examined a different mental state, the mental state of belief (Onishi 
& Baillargeon, 2005). This study is particularly important because experimental 
studies on belief have not been able to find belief understanding arising before the age 
of 3 years. Many studies have not been successful at showing an understanding of 
belief in children younger than 3, probably because the methods employed have 
required verbal responses from children (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). Onishi and 
Baillargeon (2005) utilised a nonverbal violation-of-expectation task which made it 
appropriate for younger infants, in this case, 15-month-olds. Infants in this study 
watched an experimenter hide a toy (a watermelon slice) in one of two locations (a 
green box and a yellow box). Following this, the infants watched one of four belief 
induction trials. In one condition, infants saw the experimenter watch as the yellow 
box that was empty moved closer to the green box that contained the toy, and move 
back again to the original position. In another condition, the toy moved from the green 
box to the yellow box (on its own) while the experimenter observed this taking place. 
The third condition was the same as the second condition, but this time the 
experimenter was concealed behind a curtain and because of this she could not see the
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toy moving from the green box to the yellow one. The fourth and final condition was 
longer than the other three conditions because the experimenter was present in the 
first part and watched the toy moving from the green box to the yellow. Following 
this, the curtain fell and the experimenter was unable to see the toy returning back to 
the green box. Therefore, the first two conditions were true belief conditions because 
the experimenter witnessed the movement of the boxes and the toy and the last two 
conditions were false belief conditions because the experimenter was not aware of the 
toy’s position in the final location. During the experimental trial infants saw the 
experimenter reaching to find the toy either in the green or yellow box. Infants in this 
study looked longer at the scene where the experimenter reached to the location where 
she did not see the toy being hidden. Infants therefore had an expectation that people 
reach in places where they last see something being hidden. This study is very 
important and interesting because it has managed to show understanding of false 
belief in 15-month-olds in a task on which even 3-year-olds have difficulty with.
These looking time studies have been revolutionary in that they are able to 
show results in infants of very young ages. However, they do not seem to make a 
connection between being able to show understanding, and then be able to act 
according to this understanding. It is therefore of interest to look at studies that have 
examined looking time and subsequent performance on similar experimental tasks. 
Having two tasks that can be compared can also allow us to see individual differences 
in how infants can perform on different tasks that require different skills, for example 
looking and attention in the looking time task and direct production in the 
experimental task.
However, one study that has looked at this distinction was carried out by 
Sommerville and Woodward (2005). In this study they examined whether infants can
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organise action representations in order to achieve a goal, as in the case of pulling a 
cloth to retrieve an object. In the habituation for the toy-on-cloth condition infants 
saw a demonstrator pull one of two different coloured clothes towards her and then 
grab the toy from that cloth. During testing in the new goal event, the demonstrator 
pulled the cloth that was the same as in the habituation phase, but this time the toy on 
the cloth was the opposite to the one seen during habituation. In the new means event, 
the demonstrator pulled the cloth that she did not pull during habituation, but this time 
on it was the same toy as the one that was used in habituation. For the toy-off-cloth 
condition the two toys were on the table next to the cloths. In the habituation phase 
the experimenter pulled one cloth (it was just a cloth, the toys were on the side of the 
cloth, not on it) and then grabbed the toy which was on the side of the cloth. In the 
new goal event the experimenter pulled the same cloth that the infants had seen her 
pull during habituation but grabbed the new toy. During the test trials infants looked 
longer at the new goal events in the toy-on-cloth condition, whereas on the toy-off- 
cloth condition they looked equally at both events. Sommerville and Woodward’s
(2005) findings suggest that infants understood that pulling the cloth was done to 
achieve the goal of taking the object from the cloth.
In the second part of the study, Sommerville and Woodward wanted to 
identify when infants develop the ability to organise action sequences. To assess this 
they gave infants a production task and they looked at relationships between the two 
tasks. The action condition consisted of a yellow duck which the infants handled, 
after which the duck was taken away and put on the cloth. Infants had 30 seconds to 
retrieve the duck. A number of other toys were used in consequent trials. All toys 
and cloths differed from the ones used in habituation. The results revealed that 
infants who performed planful actions in the action production condition also viewed
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the actions of the adult in the habituation as directed towards the toy. The opposite 
was found for infants who did not act planfully in the action production condition.
One important conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that infants who are 
good at attributing intentions to others, as seen through their looking time behaviour, 
are also good at producing that intention themselves.
This chapter describes a study whose motivation was to see how infants would 
perform on a looking time task where infants first become habituated to a video of a 
two-step sequence and end-result, such as those used in the experiment in chapter 3. 
After the familiarisation phase infants received one test trial that was either congruent 
or incongruent with what they had seen during habituation. The end result was 
present in both the congruent and the incongruent trials. The rational for the 
congruent trial was that infants had seen that action being performed and yielding an 
intentional intonation. Thus, when they later saw it during the test trial they would 
expect that the end-result would appear since that is the intentional action. The 
rationale for the incongruent event was that infants would have matched that action 
with the accidental intonation so they would not expect the end-result to appear after 
this accidental action was performed. We decided to make this study a between 
subjects study, and thus we were interested in examining the differences in looking 
time between the infants who saw the congruent trial during testing and the infants 
who had seen the incongruent trial during testing. The hypothesis of the looking time 
study is that infants who receive the incongruent trial would have a longer looking 
time than the infants who are presented with the congruent trial.
We also wanted to compare looking time performance to actual intention 
understanding through an imitation paradigm. We wanted to draw similar 
associations as the Sommerville and Woodward (2005) study by seeing whether the
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infants who looked longer at the incongruent condition would also produce intentional 
actions on the imitation paradigm. Therefore, after the looking time study was 
completed, infants were taken to an adjacent room where they saw the actual toy. 
During this part of the study infants sat on their parents lap and were asked to make 
the toy work just like in our previous imitation studies. The infants did not receive a 
demonstration phase in this part of the study because we wanted to see if they would 
be able to transfer their understanding and expectation from the habituation study.
The overall hypothesis of this study was that infants who had looked longer at the 
incongruent trial would also perform better on the imitation task.
5.2 Method
5.2.1 Participants
Twelve infants took part in the study. The mean age of the group was 14 months, 2 
days (range 13 months, 11 days to 14 months, 24 days). Participants were recruited 
through playgroups, libraries and leisure centres in Cardiff, Wales. The participants 
in this study first took part in the looking time paradigm, and then took part in an 
imitation trial.
5.2.2 Materials and Procedure
The materials in the looking time study consisted of 10 trials for the 
habituation phase, and 1 trial for the testing phase. The toy chosen for this study was 
Puppet. The two actions on Puppet are a pushing action and a rolling action. The 
end-result was a dragon finger puppet that appeared in a small window and moved 
about in that window. The video clips consisted of either the pushing action first 
(followed by the intentional or accidental intonation) and the rolling action second
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(followed by the intentional or accidental intonation), or the actions performed in the 
opposite order. The end-result appeared 1 second after the hand disappeared from 
view. The test events consisted of only the pushing or rolling action, this time 
without the intonation. The end result appeared 3 seconds after the hand disappeared 
from view.
The presentation program was set up so that the scene would end when infants 
looked away from it for more than 2 seconds. If infants looked away during the first 1 
second of the presentation then the same scene restarted. The experimenter watched 
the infant in a monitor next to the testing room and pressed a button when the infant 
was looking at the screen. When the infant stopped watching the scene the 
experimenter released the button. The computer calculated how long infants looked 
at the scenes. During the study infants sat on a high chair about 60 centimetres away 
from the screen. In order to get the infants to sit on the chair and also to make them 
feel more comfortable in the experimental booth, they were presented with a video of 
two puppets dancing to a children’s song. After the child sat on the high chair and 
seemed attentive to the screen, the experiment began. During the study, parents sat 
behind the child and listened to music through headphones. This was done so that 
parents would not be able to hear the intonations. Parents were instructed to smile if 
their infant looked back at them and put their arms around the infant to comfort them 
if they were feeling distressed. If infants were distressed and were reaching for their 
parent we allowed them to sit on their parent’s lap during the remaining study.
The screen used for the presentation of the stimuli was a 19 inch LCD screen. 
The camera was directly above the middle of the screen and two speakers were placed 
in the middle, below the screen. These speakers were covered over by black cloth to 
make them invisible to the child. The testing room was also covered with black cloth
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all over, except around the screen and the lens of the camera where the cloth was cut 
around these surfaces. During the study, infants were firstly presented with a bright 
line drawing that attracted their attention. Once their attention was directed to the 
screen the trials began. Before each trial, the line drawing was flashed on the screen 
in order to get the infants’ attention and then infants were presented with the next 
trial.
5.2.3 Familiarisation Trials and Test Trials
The videos for the habituation phase were edited so that there was a 1 second 
time period before the actions began. The habituation trials consisted of an adult’s 
arm and hand performing two-step actions which were followed by the end result. The 
actions were about 3 seconds apart to allow for the intonation to be uttered. When 
both actions were finished and the hand disappeared from the screen, there was a 1 
second pause before the end-result was activated. During the end-result period, the 
puppet came out of a window and danced about for a few seconds. After that the 
puppet slowly retreated. Following that there was a 90 second pause where just the 
toy remained static on the screen.
The test trials were constructed in the same way except that there was only one 
action and this was not followed by the intonation. Each action was followed by the 
end-result. The timings were also the same as in the habituation trials, with the only 
difference being a 3 second delay instead of a 1 second delay between the time when 
the hand disappeared and the end result appeared.
This study comprised 8 different orders. These 8 orders were made with four 
videos that showed the 4 possible orders of actions and intonations on the toys. To 
these 4 videos we also added the test trials and through this complete
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counterbalancing we ended up with 8 videos. Half of the infants received the 
congruent test trial and the other half the incongruent trial.
This was an infant-controlled habituation and trial study so the test trial (and 
the habituation trials) ended if the child had looked away for longer than 2 seconds or 
if they had looked for the whole duration of the trial, that is, for 90 seconds. Infants 
received a maximum of 10 habituation trials and 1 test trial.
5.2.4 Imitation Trial
After infants finished the looking time study, they were taken to the adjacent 
room to see the actual toy and perform on the imitation task. During this trial the 
infants sat on their parent’s lap and just received the toy without any previous 
presentation.
5.2.5 Scoring
The video of each infant was scored using the software program Observer.
The experimenter coded the infants’ looking during the whole trial by indicating when 
the infants were looking at the screen and when the infants looked elsewhere. The 
experimenter also coded when specific key aspects of the video took place, such as 
the toy first appearing on the screen, the appearance of the end-result and when the 
trial ended. For the habituation trials we analysed looking time from the beginning of 
the trial up until the child looked away for more than 2-3 seconds. For the analysis of 
the experimental trials, we were interested in the amount of looking that had occurred 
from the point when the end-result first appeared and until the end of the trial.
The imitation trial was scored as in the previous chapters, such as intentional 
action only, accidental action only, actions in order and actions in incorrect order.
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5.3 Results
5.3.1 Habituation Phase
On average, infants had 10 habituation trials. All children took all 10 trials 
except for one child who took 6 trials. There was no difference between the infants in 
the two conditions in their overall looking time over habituation F (l, 11) = .001,/? > 
.97. This shows that infants in the two conditions had a similar looking behaviour 
before the test trial. These results can be seen on Table 5.1.
Table 5.1. Infant Mean Looking Time During Habituation and During Test Trials in 
the Accidental and Intentional Conditions
*p < .05.
Condition Average Test Trial
habituation trials
Intentional 23.23 (4.71) 7.72 (4.74)
Accidental 23.05 (10.10) 13.56 (4.37)*
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5.3.2 Test Trials
Infants in the accidental condition looked longer at the incongruent test event 
than the infants in the intentional condition F{ 1,11) = 4.91,/? < .05. The means can 
be seen on Table 5.1. The range of looking time for the accidental condition was 
between 3.32 seconds and 15.52 seconds. The range for the accidental condition was 
8.44 seconds and 17.97 seconds.
5.3.3 Reliability
A second coder scored the videos for three of the infants in this study. The 
coder was instructed which codes to use in scoring the video and the output of the 
scoring was compared with the output of the main experimenter. Reliability was 
scored within +/- 2 frames. The results were 100% accurate.
5.3.4 Comparison With Imitation Trial
Due to having only one trial as the test trial in this study, it might not be 
completely possible to examine the relation between the infants’ looking behaviour 
and their imitative behaviour on the toy. The reason for this is because children might 
be prompted to copy the action on the test trial as that action produces the end result 
in both the accidental and intentional test trial. Due to the small number of children 
tested, we were also unable to carry out an analysis but the frequencies of the 
children’s responses can be seen on Table 5.2. From these data we can see that 
infants produced a mix of matching behaviours and nonmatching behaviours. More 
participants are needed in order to see a relationship between the looking time task 
and the imitation task. These actions can be seen on Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2. Infant’s Imitation Scores That Matched the Test Trial Action in the 
Accidental and Intentional Conditions
Trial
Matched
Trial 
Not Matched
Both Actions
Order Incorrect order
Infants 5 4 3 1
5.4 Discussion
Infants in this study were habituated to scenes of a person performing two 
actions on a toy and indicating each action as intentional and as accidental. Following 
the second action a puppet appeared as an end-result. Following the habituation trials, 
half of the infants in this study received the accidental trial and half of the infants 
received the intentional trial. The results show that the infants in the accidental 
condition looked longer than the infants in the intentional condition. This is a notable 
finding because it is significant even with 12 participants. Although these results are 
significant we need to conduct this study with more participants in order to also see 
relations with the imitation measure.
The results of this study are in agreement with the result of other studies on 
infants’ understanding of intentions and goals but it goes one step further to show that
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infants can detect and possibly infer something about the mental states of other 
people. The results of this study suggest that infants were able to form associations 
between the intonations and the actions during the habituation phase and later showed 
differential looking time responses according to the condition that they were in. The 
looking behaviour of infants in the accidental condition suggests that they had 
organised their understanding in such a way that allowed them to spot the 
incongruency in the test trial. At the same time, the results also suggest that the 
infants in the intentional condition also had an expectation about the intentional event 
which allowed them to see the test trial as congruent and going according to their 
expectations.
Whether infants were just detecting or in fact making attributions about the 
mental states is something that this task cannot tell us. However, it is possible that we 
might be able to tease the two apart by testing younger infants. It is possible that 
younger infants at 8 months might not be so skilled at attributing mental states. If 
however they exhibit similar looking times to those of the 14-month olds in this study 
then we might be able to conclude that detection is probably the primary factor 
driving these results. If on the other hand they don’t show this distinction in looking 
time, then we could assume that an inference mechanism could explain the results of 
the 14-month-olds’ looking times.
This looking time study demonstrates the distinction between intentional and 
accidental mental states through the use of an intentional and an accidental tone of 
voice. This study has confirmed and expanded the results of the previous chapters 
that found similar findings with imitation measures. However, as it was also pointed 
in the previous studies, the two tones of voice might carry a positive and a negative 
valence. As discussed previously, it is possible that.the infants in this study were able
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to do this based on the incongruency of the negative valence and the positive 
outcome. Although the imitation paradigm in Chapter 4 was not successful (due to 
limitations in our stimuli) in confirming our hypothesis that infants are making 
inferences about mental states, it is possible that we might be able to show evidence 
for that hypothesis using the looking measure with two positively valenced 
intonations.
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CHAPTER 6: GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of this chapter is to draw together the findings of the previous 
chapters and to discuss their importance and implications. Besides drawing 
conclusions from the studies addressed in this thesis, this chapter will also reflect 
upon the weaknesses and limitations of these studies. In turn the chapter will also 
consider follow up studies that could potentially provide alternative paradigms for 
these limitations and will attempt to give answers to various questions that might have 
arisen from the discussion of the results.
6.1 Summary of Main Findings
This thesis has found that vocal intonation provides important cues for 
communicating the intentions of others to infants. The results indicate that infants 
rely on intonation when making attributions about other people’s goal-directed 
behaviour. These results were first found using an imitation paradigm and extended 
and confirmed with a looking time paradigm. This thesis looked at both the 
distinction between positive and negative valence and positive and positive valence 
used to communicate mental states. At this point we are unable to confidently 
conclude about the results from the positive -  positive comparison but more studies 
will be carried out to help us understand this distinction.
6.2 Inferring Intentions From Intonation
The findings of Chapter 2 demonstrate that imitation of intentions can occur 
after both lexical and intonational information. The first study of Chapter 2 replicated 
the results of the Carpenter et al (1998) study and thus showed that infants between 14 
and 18 months can copy the intentions of other people when these intentions are
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manifested in the word “There” and tend to ignore actions indicated with the word 
“Whoops.” Similar results were observed when the words were replaced with Greek 
words that maintained the intentional and accidental intonation of the intentional and 
accidental messages. It is important to note that the results were obtained even after 
the Greek words were counterbalanced with the intonations. This allows us to 
conclude that infants can attribute intentions even when the words have no lexical 
meaning to them. Infants are able to attribute intentions on the basis of intonation 
alone. Another important finding from this study is that children were able to perform 
the task from the first trial they saw demonstrated. This is a critical finding because it 
indicates that infants were not learning through the task but instead they had a 
knowledge of intention already in place and they were exhibiting this knowledge in 
the task.
6.3 Intention Understanding from Intonation with a Video-Recorded Method
The third chapter assessed a new methodological approach for presenting the 
imitation paradigm. This was motivated for two reasons. The first reason for using 
this video methodology was concerned with the application of intonation control. 
Since the main purpose of the thesis was the investigation of intonation cues, it was 
important to assess different intonations in pilot studies and to present them 
consistently to each participant. By presenting infants with these prerecorded video 
we were able to carry out pilot studies in which adults rated the intonations and thus 
chose the most representative intonations. Another important reason for using this 
methodology was to see whether infants would be able to perform similarly to the live 
task or whether they would be hindered by the fact that it was not live and in addition 
by the fact that the only visible human characteristic was that of an arm. The results
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of this study showed that infants were not hindered by the methodological differences 
of this study. Previously, studies had found that children are sensitive to differences 
in the type of demonstration. For example, Meltzoff (1995) found that when infants 
were presented with a human demonstrator they were able to infer what the 
demonstrator’s goal and intention was when he was failing to pull apart two parts of a 
dumbell. However, when the demonstrator was a machine, children did not attribute 
an intention or a goal to this machine. This and many other studies (Baillargeon, 
2004; Woodward, 1998) that have found similar results demonstrate that infants are 
sensitive to human agency and they tend to treat humans and inanimate agents 
differently. In the case of this study, even thought the modeller was not present there 
in the room but was presented through the monitor, children were still able to attribute 
intentions and thus saw this demonstrator as an animate agent.
In addition to this, other research found mixed results regarding infants’ 
abilities to represent information presented through videos instead of live 
demonstrations and proposed that infants display a “video deficit effect” (Anderson & 
Pempek, 2005). Our results however seem to demonstrate that there is no such deficit 
in our sample. The results therefore are in accordance to the proposition posited by 
Deocampo and Hudson (2005) who have suggested that imitation tasks might not 
require dual representation competence as other studies that were conducted with 
video demonstrations, such as object search tasks.
Although our video-demonstration study proved similar to the live studies, 
there was one complication with one of the toys, Rudolf. This toy proved to be 
problematic as in the video one of its action components was not as salient as the 
other one, so children tended to prefer one action over the other. When this was 
discovered and controlled for in the analysis the results still showed similarities to
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those of the live study in Chapter 2. The studies in Chapter 3 also showed differences 
between the older and younger children, like in the studies of Chapter 2. The 16- to 
18-month-olds in this study performed better than the 14-month-olds. The fact that 
some 14-month-olds in this study performed equally well to the 16- to 18-month-olds 
indicates that there are individual differences in the acquisition of intention 
understanding and that it is not an attainment that is seen in a narrow age group.
6.4 Distinguishing Positive Mental States
The fourth chapter reported the results of a study that tried to assess the 
understanding of mental states from two equally positive intonations. This study 
offers the first attempt to distinguish between valence and meaning for mental states 
through the tone of voice. The results of this study showed that 18-month-olds 
performed fewer intentional actions than in our previous studies and a lot more 
accidental actions than in our previous studies. There are possible explanations for 
this study’s results. Firstly, it is possible that infants’ failure to succeed on this task 
might be associated to the inability to distinguish between the two mental states. It is 
possible that by controlling the valence we have taken away the cue that was salient to 
the infants and made it difficult for them to distinguish the purposeful and 
nonpurposeful mental states. Secondly, the study has potential confounds. One of 
these confounds is that the words used for the purposeful and accidental mental states 
were both the same. During the pilot study we presented adult judges with the words 
Ochi and Nato expressed in different intentional and accidental intonations. We used 
these two words for consistency as this was what we had used in our previous studies. 
However, when it came to the results, the two intonations that were rated as highly 
accidental and intentional and at the same time rated as equally positive were both of
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the word Nato. Due to time constrains we decided to use the two stimuli even if the 
words were the same. Because of this it is possible that the findings might be 
confounded as a result of having the same words. As we saw from previous studies, 
infants at the age of 18 months are acquiring language and therefore, by having two 
stimuli be the same word might have affected the results negatively (Friend, 2001). 
Future studies need to be conducted to account for such confounding effects.
6.5 Assessing Intention Understanding Through a Looking Time Measure
The fifth chapter examined infant intention understanding with an alternative 
methodology to that previously used. Imitation was used in the previous chapters but 
because we'found that the 14-month-olds were not performing as well as the older 
children, and because we know from previous research that they have an 
understanding of intentions at that age, we decided to assess their understanding with 
another method, a looking time paradigm. There has been a lot of research done with 
even very young babies using looking time measures and one of their advantages is 
that it only requires infants to look, something that even very young infants are 
capable of. Looking time measures rest on the assumption that infants dishabituate to 
events that violate their expectation and thus they look longer at those events. This 
study is among the first to examine looking time using intonation as the critical cue 
and in addition it is the first to assess infant’s understanding in a between-subjects 
design using only one test event which is novel in both the congruent and the 
incongruent test trials. Previously studies had used up to 3 pairs of test trials and they 
assessed this in a within-subjects design.
The results of this study revealed that infants looked longer at scenes that 
violated their expectation, that is, they looked longer at scenes that depicted the
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accidental action being followed by the end-result. This shows that even infants of 13 
and 14 months are able to detect the goal of the demonstrator and they look longer 
when the goal is met with the unintentional action. This is a very important finding 
and it will be discussed further as these results and this methodology open new areas 
of exploration for intention understanding and the distinction between purposeful and 
nonpurposeful, or accidental behaviours more precisely.
The looking time study of this thesis shows that even young infants who have 
not exhibited this understanding in the imitation task were able to show awareness on 
the looking time measure. Although the results of the looking time study are still 
preliminary, they suggest that infants look longer at the incongruent events where the 
accidental action is paired with the end result. Although it is not possible to say what 
it is exactly that infants are showing in looking time studies, the results of several 
looking time studies seem to suggest that infants have expectations about actions and 
the goal directedness of these actions. It is interesting to see that infants in the 
accidental condition looked on average longer than the children in the intentional 
condition therefore this suggests that they perceived the inconsistency and looked 
longer. This study’s findings are similar to studies conducted with looking tinie 
paradigms and which have found that infants detect discrepancies and show 
awareness of goal-directedness (Sodian & Thoermer, 2004; Sommerville & 
Woodward, 2005). Infants in our study seem to be aware of goal directedness and 
furthermore they appear to be aware of the tone of voice as a cue for mental states. 
The significance of our study lies in the cue of intonation. Previously a lot of studies 
on intention understanding and goal attribution looked at actions as a cue. In our 
study, the actions made by the demonstrator were visually similar and were 
discriminated as accidental or intentional through the intonation. Due to the
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encouraging results of this initial study we would like to carry on collecting more data 
in order to get results with stronger significance.
One possible reason why infants might be finding the imitation task harder but 
still exhibiting understanding through looking time could be as a result of their 
inability to inhibit some cues over others. It is possible that even though infants spot 
the incongruency in the looking time task, when they get to produce that 
understanding they might find the task too complex for their abilities. Further studies 
that look at inhibition, attention and information processing as possible factors 
affecting infants’ performance are needed to understand this difference between 
recognition and production.
6.6 Intention Understanding in Infancy
The studies of the second and third chapters demonstrate that the 
understanding of intention progresses rapidly in the first month of a child’s second 
year. Although our study has shown that 14-month-olds might not produce as strong 
results as 18-month-olds, they still seem to have a rudimentary understanding of 
another person’s intentions from intonation. The findings from this thesis go together 
with other similar studies that have used the same methodology such as those of 
Carpenter et al (1998) and more recently the study by Olineck and Poulin-Dubois
(2006). Similar findings on the general area of intention understanding have been 
proposed by other researchers such as in the studies by Tomasello and colleagues
(2005), Meltzoff (1995) and Bellagamba and colleagues (1999; 2006) among others.
This finding that intention understanding develops in the first half of the 
second year goes against some of the theories in the field. Continuous theorists 
support that the age at which infants come to understand and infer mental states is
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often early in development, and is an ability that allows infants to perceive other 
people as intentional beings, even from the first months after birth (Legerstee, 2005). 
Trevarthen (1979) also has proposed that infants are capable of early intersubjectivity 
where from the first months they are able to share emotion with others. This early 
intersubjectivity later gives rise to secondary intersubjectivity and this is depicted in 
episodes where infants are beginning to share with others aspects in their 
environment. Although this theory might have similarities to other theories in the 
field, such as Michael Tomasello’s theory about joint attention, still attributing 
intention understanding to very young infants, although a tempting supposition, it still 
needs to be interpreted with caution. Despite this, it is evident that emotion plays a 
very important role in the lives of young infants. Further research is needed to draw 
consistent links between how emotion might be related to forming an understanding 
of intentions and its progression from early infancy to later infancy.
Understanding other people’s mental states is a great achievement of young 
infants as it shows that around 16 months infants display some aspects of a theory of 
mind. Some researchers propose that what we see from studies such as the ones 
reported in this thesis is only elementary in comparison to standard theory of mind 
such as the Sally-Anne task and the Smarties task which call for an understanding of 
belief. Understanding others’ intentions as was seen in this thesis is only one aspect 
of understanding the mental states of others but recently more research has been 
conducted on belief in 15-month-olds and this study has produced some exciting 
findings that suggest that an understanding of others’ mental states might arise before 
the age of 4 years as it was previously thought (Onish & Bailargeon, 2006).
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6.7 Intonation as a Salient Cue to Intentions
The important message from this thesis is that intonation is a salient cue for 
inferring mental states. All experimental studies in this thesis, except one whose 
drawbacks we have discussed, have shown that the tone of voice is something that can 
indicate the purposeful or accidental nature of a message. In addition, this thesis’ 
findings support results from previous research that has found that intonation can 
guide the behaviour of infants. The studies reported in this thesis are in accordance 
with the findings of studies carried out by other researchers. Similar findings on the 
effect of intonation on behaviour have been reported by Femald (1992) who found 
that mothers used specific intonation contours to convey messages such as approval, 
prohibition, and attention, which were also used to elicit specific behaviour from the 
infants themselves. Similar findings have also been reported by Stem et al (1982) and 
Sullival and Horowitz (1983). Interestingly, the intonation reported by all these 
researchers, such as bell shaped or falling contours for approvals and rise for attention 
are similar to the intonation that we used in our studies to express purposeful and 
nonpursposeful meaning. Papousek et al (1990) also report rising intonation contours 
and they also ascribe them the role of eliciting attention. Papousek et al though 
conclude that the high pitch might be the responsible characteristic for the effect of 
maintaining infant attention. However, in our positive-negative study we have used a 
rising contour that has a lower mean pitch than the intentional one. This could 
therefore suggest that the pitch as a characteristic of intonation might not be enough to 
communicate meaning. This implies that intonation contours are important signals 
to infants, however, we do not propose that they are the only characteristic of 
intonation that contributes to meaning. An interplay of other acoustical characteristics
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of intonation, such as pitch range, duration, amplitude and voice quality also play an 
important role in identifying and inferring meaning from utterances.
In addition to taking intonation characteristics into account, it is important to 
consider the context in which the intonations are uttered in and also who is uttering 
these intonations. For example, it is possible that in our studies the context of the 
novel toys with the end-result could have helped children in interpreting the intentions 
of the experimenter by discerning that the desire and the goal of the experimenter was 
to get the end result. Following from this end goal it is possible that children 
attributed the intention of the experimenter to be what the experimenter is going to do 
to get to that goal. Because the actions themselves were not informative in these 
studies infants relied on the two intonations to help them decipher which action was 
that activated the end result.
Recently, studies that have looked at the intonation patterns of parents reading 
books with humorous and sweet themes to their children have found that parents use a 
rising intonation when reading the humorous book (Hoicka & Gattis, 2006). These 
researchers propose that parents are using the rising contour in order to indicate to 
their child that something in the text is not quite right and that it requires 
interpretation. They further suggest that because humour often is the result of 
incongruity, parents are trying to indicate this incongruity with their tone of voice. By 
using this rising contour, parents are trying to communicate to their children 
humorous mental states.
The results of these studies help to carry this view further by suggesting that 
the tone of voice helps infants to gain understanding into other people’s intentions.
The results of this study are an extension to the Carpenter et al. (1998) and Olineck 
and Poulin-Dubois (2005) studies.
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6.8 Purposeful vs Nonpurposeful Actions and Mental States
Mental states are the unobservable internal states of people’s minds which can 
be inferred or deduced through actions and behavioural cues. The focus of this thesis 
was mental states and in particular intentions and how these can be inferred from the 
tone of voice. One interesting aspect of this thesis is the distinction between 
purposeful and nonpurposeful mental states. When studying intention understanding 
it is important to be able to understand when something is done purposefully and 
equally important to understand that something is done but without that purpose in 
mind. However, there are still questions that still need answers such as whether being 
able to understand the intentions of others might necessitate an understanding that 
others also do things by accident. That is, to be able to have an understanding of 
others’ actions as intentional does one might need to understand that sometimes 
people do things that go against what they intended. More studies need to be done in 
order to examine when infants first show an understanding that others sometimes do 
accidental actions that do not meet their intentions.
What we still are not aware of is when the distinction between accidental and 
intentional actions arises. Very young infants might be able to detect intention 
understanding in actions that are clearly intentional and clearly accidental but they 
might still not be able to identify them as mental states. In our studies infants were 
shown actions that looked similar perceptually but the mental state carried through the 
intonation was indicating whether they were intentional or accidental. It is therefore 
possible that even younger infants than those tested in this thesis, would be able to do 
well on the task if they are presented with explicitly accidental and intentional actions 
with the appropriate intonation. Being able to see this distinction earlier will help us 
understand the progression of action perception and how it links with the
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understanding of others’ minds. In addition, this progression will also allow us to 
draw comparisons between actions as mental states and other forms of behaviour such 
as intonation and facial expressions. Finally, it might also help us understand whether 
distinguishing between intentional and accidental mental states might first arise as 
perceptual detection in action and then progress into inference of a mental state.
Future Studies
6.9 Intonational characteristics in communicating intentions
The literature on the role of intonation contours and acoustical characteristics 
is still not very concise on what might have a more influential role when making 
decisions about emotions and attitudes. More consistent research needs to be done 
with adult participants in order to understand the role that certain contours, in 
combination to other characteristics might have on inferring attitudes and mental 
states. One other important characteristic of intonation which might be especially 
significant to indicating intentions is that of the force or intensity of the voice. Often 
parents report that their children will not respond to them saying “no” to certain 
occasions but that when the parent expresses the “no” with more forceful intonation 
then children tend to take the message more seriously. This might be similar to what 
other studies on nonverbal communication have found. For example, Behne, 
Carpenter and Tomasello (2005) found that it is the way that someone points and the 
way that someone gazes that makes a difference on whether a child will find a toy 
hidden in the location that these gestures are directed towards. Fourteen- and 18- 
month-olds in this study were not able to find the hidden toy if the experimenter used 
absent-minded gaze and distracted point, but indeed found the toy if the gaze was 
ostensive and the point more intentional. Therefore, just as the way in which these
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gestures differ, perhaps so does the intonation in communicating intentions. It would 
therefore be interesting to study intonation characteristics and their interactions with 
communicative intentions. Intonation is a very dynamic stimulus and there are many 
aspects of it that still need clarification. To conduct this type of research one has to be 
familiarised with computer programs that allow speech to be simulated in order to 
contain certain characteristics of intonation, such as a certain level of pitch, a certain 
Fo range, amplitude and duration.
6.10 What voices and agents do infants attribute intentions to?
We know from previous research that infants attribute intentions to human 
agents. One possible next study that could help us explore this further is to examine 
whether infants can still attribute this intention to a nonhuman agent. It is possible 
that if a rod is doing the actions and getting the end result while the same human 
intonations follow after each action, children might not be able to do well on the task 
because they might not be able to associate the intonations with the end result and the 
mental states of the rod. Therefore, children might only be able to do this task in the 
context of a human person even if they are unable to see the human’s face as we saw 
in the study reported in Chapter 3.
Another interesting comparison would be to use different voices in 
combination with the human and nonhuman agents. For example in order to assess 
the effect of intonation we could use a nonhuman agent such as a rod doing the 
actions but at the same time use a human voice to express the mental states.
Similarly, we could use a human agent such as a limb for the actions and a metallic 
computerised voice that will still communicate intentional and accidental mental 
states.
6.11 Distinguishing two Positive Mental States
The study described in chapter 4 that compared two positive sounding 
intonations that portrayed two different mental states found null results. Because of 
this null result we are not in a position to interpret the findings. However, there are 
possibilities for why the results have turned out this way and these interpretations 
allow us to plan for further studies. The first predicament is that the words that were 
used in the study were both the same. As it was discussed above this could have 
confused children. The reason for this confusion might be that infants at this age are 
word learners and this might have an influence as they could be focussing a lot on the 
actual words and might be disregarding the intonation. The study by Friend (2001) 
found that infants who had a better vocabulary focused more on the words of a 
message rather than the intonation. Therefore, a further study could repeat the same 
rationale but should include two different words rather than the same one. Overall, it 
seems that this study was too difficult for the 18-month-olds and this suggests that we 
might need to take a step back, understand the effect of valence better with the help of 
adult participants and then try another study with infants.
Another follow up study that can prove important in trying to see this 
distinction between two mental states that are expressed with similar valence had been 
utilised by Walker-Andrews and her colleagues (1983; 1991). In their studies they 
habituated infants to a visual stimulus while they presented an audio stimulus 
simultaneously. After habituation, during the test event, they maintained the same 
visual stimulus but they changed the audio stimulus and they saw that infants 
dishabituated if they noticed a change in the audio stimulus. This type of paradigm 
can be used when we want to test infants on their discrimination abilities for different
116
intonations. This will give us an idea of whether infants can actually tell the 
difference between two similarly valenced words that mean a different mental state.
6.12 Using Looking Time Measures to Gain Insight to Accidental Understanding 
In using the Carpenter et al (1998) method, we found that 14 month olds were 
not as proficient as the older infants in interpreting the intentions of others. This 
finding is similar to the findings of Meltzoff (1995) and Bellagamba and colleagues
(2006). It is possible that intonational cues to unintentional or accidental events might 
arise later than the understanding of intentional events. However, we cannot say this 
for certain as there is a lack of research in this particular area. Therefore, we propose 
that systematic studies have to be conducted in order to see when the distinction 
between accidental and intentional actions first arises. We have talked about how 
action understanding is very important in early infancy so a study might be conducted 
using a preferential looking technique. In using the preferential looking technique, 
infants can be presented with a video of someone’s hand doing a clear accidental 
action with an object and another hand doing a clear intentional action with an object. 
These videos can be manipulated so the accidental and intentional manipulation of the 
object happens at the same time and at which time a middle speaker can present an 
accidental audio message for half of the children and an intentional audio message for 
the other half of the children. The dependent variable in this case will be how long 
infants look at the matching video combination. It is expected that they will look 
longer at the matching video than the nonmatching video-audio combination. This 
study can utilise intonation as a cue instead of lexical terms because we know from 
our findings and from previous research that intonation is a salient cue to young 
infants.
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When we will be able to understand when this understanding between 
intentional and unintentional behaviour arises, we can begin to examine what it is that 
might give rise to the understanding of this distinction. Methods that utilise looking 
time can potentially become very useful when working with young infants.
In addition to this, it would also be interesting to see when and how infants 
begin to understand that people do things they did not intend but at the same time they 
meet their goal. For example, when do infants begin to understand the concept that 
sometimes people get “lucky” even when they did not intend to do something but they 
still achieved their goal. Luck is often expressed with surprise because something that 
you did not expect or in some cases something that you did not intend gave out a 
positive result. In those cases, it looks like something nonpurposeful or perhaps 
negative can result in something positive. Can children understand this distinction as 
well or do they only understand that something positive can give rise to something 
positive and that something negative can give rise to something negative? Research 
suggests that around the age of 9 months, infants might be able to cognitively 
evaluating discrepant events (Scherer, Zetner & Stem, 2004) Attributing mental states 
and perhaps the evaluation of purposeful and accidental events could utilise cognitive 
mechanisms. This understanding of the distinction between purposeful and 
nonpurposeful actions and mental states is something that could be assessed through 
looking time methodologies.
6.13 Desires and Intentions
The mental state of desire has received some attention in childhood but not in 
infancy. Desire is related to outcomes and goals. Malle and Knobe (2001) propose 
that the content of desires is the outcome as in the sentence “Jane wants to have a
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birthday party,” whereas intention refers to the goal-directed actions undertaken to 
achieve an outcome, such as “Jane intends to make a cake.” The birthday party and 
the cake both are goals to these desires and intentions. This example shows us the 
subtle distinction between desires and intentions. Another interesting proposition 
from Malle and Knobe is concerned with the type of reasoning required for desires 
and intentions. They suggest that because desires and intentions differ in content then 
they also operate differently as a way of reasoning. They propose that desires are 
often the input of reasoning whereas intentions the output of reasoning. The example 
they give is that if someone has a desire to help a homeless person (input) then this 
may lead to them volunteering in a soup kitchen (output). This then leads to making a 
distinction between having a desire for which one might do nothing about and an 
intention which is more likely to end up in some form of action (Malle & Knobe, 
2001).
Studies in childhood have found that children understand desire earlier than 
they understand other mental states such as beliefs and one possible reason for this is 
that desires might be easier to infer than beliefs (Wellman & Woolley, 1990). Due to 
the subtle but distinct differences between desires and intentions, it would be 
interesting to study these in infancy.
6.14 Using Neuroimaging Technology to Study Intention Understanding
One other interesting question that arises from this thesis is whether intention 
understanding through intonation is a valence based task or an intention based task. 
An interesting prospect is to study this in adults through fMRI methodology.
Recently an area that has received a lot of attention is that of mirror neurons. It has 
been suggested that a special area in monkeys’ brains (F5 -  ventral premotor cortex)
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lights up when they watch conspecifics perform actions, or when they hear an action 
taking place (Rizolatti, Fadiga, Gallese & Fogassi, 1996). Similarly, in humans 
researchers have found that the human mirror neuron system (BA 44 -  inferior frontal 
gyrus of Brodmann area) is active when humans are presented with dynamic facial 
expressions (Sato, Kochiyama, Yoshikawa, Naito & Matsumura, 2004). These 
findings suggest that this area in the brain involves the understanding of actions and 
that in addition it might be involved in processing dynamic emotional stimuli. Our 
pre-recorded demonstrations have actions in them that look very similar and 
intonations that distinguish these actions from one another as to the intention of the 
speaker. These demonstrations could be presented to adults in the fMRI scanner and 
we could see whether the intonation in this context could be processed in a similar 
way to the studies on facial expressions. In addition, as intonations on their own 
(without the actions) are dynamic and social stimuli, it would be interesting to see if 
they would activate the same area on their own.
6.15 Using ERP to Study Positive Mental States
Event-related brain potential is a method that has been used to study brain 
activation to different stimuli. Studies have also used it to look at brain responses to 
the emotional prosody of happiness, anger and neutral emotion (Grossmann, Striano 
& Friederici, 2005). This particular study has found that infants show differential 
activation between these three emotional prosodies. More specifically, the prosody 
for anger elicited more negative response in the ERPs than did the other two prosodies 
which suggests that infants were paying more attentions to the angry prosody. This 
was also found for happy prosody over neutral prosody and it suggests that emotional 
stimuli might receive more processing from the brain than neutral stimuli.
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This type of methodology would be useful in seeing the effect that two 
positive intonations that express two different mental states would have on infants’ 
ERPs. It is possible that the mental state of accidental might be allocated more 
attention due to the fact that it has the rising contour, which we propose might be 
associated with being more questioning and might require more attention and 
inference.
6.16 Links With Language Acquisition
We have also seen in the introduction of this thesis that intonation also plays 
an important role in language acquisition as it helps children with the parsing of 
sounds and the highlighting of important aspects of language. Because of this 
important role that intonation plays in developing language, it would be interesting to 
examine more closely how parents use their tone of voice when talking to their 
children, how their children respond to that and more specifically look at whether 
imitation may play a part in these interactions between parent and child. It would be 
interesting to also see how infants’ babbling progresses from simple forms to more 
complex forms. This might also allow us to draw comparisons between the research 
described in the introduction regarding production abilities in young infants.
Conclusions
The first two experimental chapters of this thesis have shown that the tone of 
voice is a salient cue to mental states. Infants did not only distinguish between 
intentional and accidental words such as Whoops and There but they also made the 
distinction between intentional and accidental mental states from the intonation alone. 
The looking time measure has also shown promising results for the same distinction
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between intentional and accidental mental states. The looking time study has 
confirmed and extended the findings that we saw through imitation. Infants seemed 
able to distinguish between an intentional and an accidental intonation and looked 
longer during scenes where the accidental intonation was paired with the end-result. 
These findings are the first to report results on the intonation of accidental and 
intentional mental states. The results of this thesis contribute to the literature 
concerning intention understanding and they extend our knowledge about intonation 
and the significant role it plays in infancy.
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Appendix 1
Figure Caption
Figure 2.1 Photographs of the toys and end results used in the experimental trials of 
the studies. The actions on the first toy consisted of rolling the wheels and lifting the 
handle. The end-result was a jack in the box. The second toy consisted of pulling a 
rubber ring which was attached to string and lifting a blue extended block of wood. 
The end-result was a reindeer that made punching movements. The third toy 
consisted of pushing a button and rolling a button. The end-result was a dancing elf. 
The fourth toy consisted of rolling a ring and pushing a button. The end-result was a 
green dragon puppet.
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Appendix 2
Instructions for the two undergraduate pilot studies.
